First Amendment Right to a Remedy by Plener Cover, Benjamin
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Articles Faculty Works
2017
First Amendment Right to a Remedy
Benjamin Plener Cover
University of Idaho College of Law, bcover@uidaho.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Works at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation




The First Amendment Right 
to a Remedy 
Benjamin Plener Cover* 
Scholars and jurists agree that the First Amendment right “to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances” includes a right of court 
access, but narrowly define this right as the right to file a lawsuit. This 
dominant view fails to meaningfully differentiate between the right to 
petition, the freedom of speech, and due process, missing the distinct 
significance of the Petition Clause when individuals petition courts. The 
most significant threats to court access today occur after the filing stage, 
when courts deny or limit remedies to legally injured persons — by 
enforcing a mandatory arbitration provision or an exhaustion 
requirement, granting an official qualified or absolute immunity from suit, 
or drastically reducing a damages award pursuant to a statutory cap. By 
defining court access too narrowly, the prevailing theory of the right to 
petition renders the First Amendment silent in the face of these threats. 
This Article fills this gap in First Amendment theory by presenting the 
first systematic account of the right to petition the courts that expands the 
concept of court access from procedural forum access to substantive 
remedial access — guaranteeing the right of a legally injured person to 
obtain a meaningful remedy. This remedial theory best accounts for the 
history, text, and precedent of the Petition Clause. As a historical matter, 
this theory gains force from the insight that the First Amendment right to 
petition is best understood as the merger of the English right to petition 
and the English right to a remedy. These antecedent rights controlled 
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petitioning practice directed at different institutional actors, but, when 
those petitions were legal in nature, there was a shared expectation that 
relief, where warranted, would follow. From a textual perspective, the 
remedial theory gives the Petition Clause meaning independent of the 
Speech Clause, and it explains why the Framers expanded the Petition 
Clause’s recipient subclause from “the Legislature” to “the Government.” 
Jurisprudentially, the theory garners a perhaps surprising degree of 
support from both early and modern Supreme Court precedent. This 
theory could translate naturally into a tiered scrutiny doctrinal 
framework for remedial access claims, with more deferential review for 
neutral time, place, and manner provisions, and heightened scrutiny when 
remedial burdens are based on the content of the lawsuit, the identity of 
the plaintiff, or the defendant’s governmental status. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ubi jus ibi remedium — “where there is a right, there should be a 
remedy.”1 This ancient legal maxim articulates a great aspirational 
ideal of Anglo-American legal culture.2 But it is not an accurate 
description of the American legal system. Not every person who 
suffers (or fears) legal injury obtains a remedy from the courts. The 
person may lack the resources or sophistication to access the judicial 
forum in the first place. But even when a legally injured person files 
suit, a court may deny a remedy for a host of reasons. Perhaps the 
plaintiff failed to exhaust other remedies, or signed a contract of 
adhesion containing a mandatory arbitration provision, or filed after 
expiry of a statute of limitation or repose. Perhaps the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights were violated by a state judge or prosecutor who 
enjoys absolute immunity under the Court’s interpretation of 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, or by a police officer whose excessive force crossed 
no clearly established line for purposes of qualified immunity 
doctrine. For all these reasons — and more — the courthouse door 
may be open, but the remedial function of the courts may be closed. 
The gap between right and remedy is real, and possibly growing. 
In the face of remedy denial, the critical question is whether a 
legally injured person enjoys an enforceable right to a remedy. Unlike 
an aspirational ideal, an enforceable remedial right would entail a 
correlative duty upon courts to provide redress and thereby impose 
meaningful constraints on remedy denial. There is significant 
disagreement on the source, scope, and very existence of a remedial 
right. State constitutional provisions in forty states3 explicitly or 
implicitly codify a “right to a remedy,”4 but interpretation of these 
 
 1 Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1485-86 
(1987) [hereinafter Of Sovereignty]. The equitable analogue of this legal maxim is 
“equity will not suffer wrong without a remedy.” JOHN NORTON POMEROY, 2 A TREATISE 
ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADAPTED 
FOR ALL THE STATES AND TO THE UNION OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES UNDER THE 
REFORMED PROCEDURE § 423 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941).  
 2 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 
784-86 (2004) (referring to maxim as a “platitude”). 
 3 Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1309, 1310 n.6 (2003) (citing state constitutional provisions). 
 4 Id. at 1310; see also John H. Bauman, Remedies Provisions in State Constitutions 
and the Proper Role of the State Courts, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 237 (1991); 
Jonathan M. Hoffman, Questions Before Answers: The Ongoing Search to Understand the 
Origins of the Open Courts Clause, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1005, 1005 n.1 (2001); William C. 
Koch, Jr., Reopening Tennessee’s Open Courts Clause: A Historical Reconsideration of 
Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 333, 340-42 
  
1744 University of California, Davis [Vol. 50:1741 
provisions by state supreme courts has varied widely across 
jurisdiction.5 In recent years, scholars have argued for a federal 
constitutional right to a remedy based on the Due Process Clause, the 
Equal Protection Clause, or the Privileges and Immunities Clause,6 but 
cases analyzing remedy denial under the Fourteenth Amendment have 
generally applied rational basis review and upheld the restrictions. 
Building on these prior efforts,7 this article argues that the most 
compelling basis for a federal remedial right — as a matter of history, 
 
(1997); Hans A. Linde, Without “Due Process”: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. 
L. REV. 125, 136 (1970); David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 
1197, 1198-99 (1992).  
 5 For example, Article I, section 8 of the Minnesota Constitution states: “Every 
person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he 
may receive to his person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and 
without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, 
conformable to the laws.” MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 8. But when Justice John E. Simonett 
of the Minnesota Supreme Court suggested that those words be carved into the granite 
wall of the Minnesota Judicial Center, Justice Glenn E. Kelley objected because “if 
[they] put that up on the wall, people are going to read it before they came into court 
and say, ‘Here, I’m entitled to a remedy. Let’s have it.’” Randall Tietjen, “An 
Inarticulate Premise Intuitively Felt,” 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 784, 793-94 (2013). 
The original architectural plans proposed to carve on the “Dedicatory Wall” the names 
of the state Supreme Court Justices, the Governor, legislative leaders, and the architect 
himself. Id. Justice Kelley cautioned that the provision is “inspirational [but] [y]ou 
can’t take the language so literally.” Id. So the façade engravers edited the language, 
replacing the first clause with ellipses: “Every person is entitled . . . to obtain justice 
freely and without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without 
delay, conformable to the law.” Hopefully, that would inspire those visiting the 
courthouse without raising unreasonable expectations. 
 6 See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process 
and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 529 (2005); Steven 
J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 509-10 (1991); Risa E. Kaufman, Access to the Courts as 
a Privilege or Immunity of National Citizenship, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1477, 1484 (2008); 
Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due 
Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1634 (2004). Other provisions of the federal 
constitution relevant to remedial rights include Article III, the Guarantee Clause, the 
Habeas Corpus Clause, and the Supremacy Clause. Judith Resnik argues for a remedial 
imperative based on multiple state and federal constitutional provisions. See Judith 
Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, 
and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2822-24 (2015).  
 7 These efforts resonate with one another, but emphasize different textual bases. 
Theories based on state constitutional provisions fail to recognize a federal 
constitutional right to a remedy and the close link between the First Amendment’s 
Petition Clause and remedy-guaranteeing provisions in state constitutions. See 
Phillips, supra note 3, at 1310 (describing “the guarantee of a right of access to the 
courts to obtain a remedy for injury” as the “most widespread and important of . . . 
unique state provisions” that “contain[] rights and guarantees not found in the 
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text, and precedent — lies in the final clause of the First Amendment 
— the Petition Clause — which guarantees the “right of the people . . . 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”8 Scholars,9 
lower courts,10 and the Supreme Court11 have repeatedly recognized 
 
Federal Constitution”). Theories based on other provisions of the federal 
constitutional fail to ground the right to a remedy in the distinctive text, history, 
function, precedent, and doctrinal framework of the First Amendment.  
 8 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Petition Clause has long been overshadowed by its 
clausal kin. See, e.g., Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition 
Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 558 & n.4 
(1999) [hereinafter Right of Access]; Anita Hodgkiss, Petitioning and the Empowerment 
Theory of Practice, 96 YALE L.J. 569, 569 & n. 1 (1987); Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial 
Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2153, 2155-57 (1998); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition 
Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 15, 16 & n.2 (1993) (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., Why Have a Bill of Rights?, 26 
VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1991)) (omitting the right to petition from account of First 
Amendment rights). In recent decades, however, the right to petition has enjoyed a 
quiet renaissance of judicial and scholarly attention. Influential scholarship includes. 
See Andrews, supra, at 557; Mark, supra, at 2153; James E. Pfander, Sovereign 
Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial 
Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899, 899 (1997); Spanbauer, supra, 
at 16. Significant Supreme Court cases include: Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. 
Ct. 2488, 2491 (2011); BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 524-25 
(2002); and Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 409-10 (2002).  
 9 See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.54, 
at 1378 (7th ed. 2004); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE 
L.J. 1131, 1156 & n. 120 (1991) [hereinafter The Bill of Rights]; Andrews, Right of 
Access, supra note 8, at 595-96, 589-92, nn.117, 119 (collecting scholarship); Pfander, 
supra note 8, at 900; Spanbauer, supra note 8, at 63; Note, A Petition Clause Analysis of 
Suits Against the Government: Implications for Rule 11 Sanctions, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1111, 1112 (1993). 
 10 See Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8, at 589-90 nn.117–18 (collecting 
cases). 
 11 In more than twenty Supreme Court cases over the past five decades, one or 
more Justices has asserted or assumed that a lawsuit is a petition, without a single 
colleague disputing the premise. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 (2014); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 122-23 (2006) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); BE & K Constr. Co., 536 U.S. at 525; Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415 
& n.12; Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 406 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fla. Bar v. 
Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 636 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Prof’l Real 
Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56-57 (1993); 
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 
896-97 (1984); Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983); Rhodes 
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 362 n.9 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); 
Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 244 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828 n.6 (1974); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 
(1973); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972); Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972); United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 
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lawsuits as petitions.12 And there is a broad judicial and scholarly 
consensus — which I join — that the right to petition includes a 
negative right to be free from retaliation for, or suppression of, 
petitioning activity.13 But scholars and jurists have generally assumed 
 
U.S. 576, 580 (1971); United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 
U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967); Bhd. R.R. Trainmen v. Va. ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 
(1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963). I discuss many of these cases 
in Part II.D, infra, demonstrating the considerable and underappreciated support they 
provide, not only for treating lawsuits as petitions, but for recognizing a First 
Amendment right to a remedy.  
 12 However, five years ago, in Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 
(2011), Justices Scalia and Thomas threw down the gauntlet on lawsuits’ First 
Amendment status, attacking the proposition as “quite doubtful,” id. at 2503 (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2501 (Thomas, J., concurring), and 
dismissing prior opinions affirming it as “vague[],” id. at 2503 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part), “[u]nreasoned,” id. at 2501 (Thomas, J., concurring), 
and “pure dictum,” id. at 2502-03 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). Though this attack was profoundly mistaken, see infra Part I, the majority 
added fuel to the fire with an equivocal rejoinder, alternatively characterizing lawsuits’ 
First Amendment status as a principle that “precedents confirm,” Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2494, and as a “premise” upon which the “parties litigated the case.” Id. at 2494. 
Justice Scalia seized on the majority’s ambivalence as a concession of lawsuits’ 
uncertain First Amendment status. Id. at 2503 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The Court has never actually held that a lawsuit is a 
constitutionally protected ‘Petition,’ nor does today’s opinion hold that. The Court 
merely observes that ‘[t]he parties litigated the case on the premise.’” (emphasis in 
original) (citation omitted)). The Guarnieri majority declined to dispute Justice 
Scalia’s characterization of its holding. The confusion in Guarnieri suggests that the 
Court must and will authoritatively resolve this question in a future case. 
 13 See, e.g., BE & K Constr. Co., 536 U.S. at 536-37; Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc., 
508 U.S. at 56, 60-61; Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging. . .”: An 
Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 
1195 (1986); Spanbauer, supra note 8, at 47-48. Most published opinions have 
involved claims of retaliation. The most common sanction challenged is adverse 
employment action. See, e.g., Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2492; Gunter v. Morrison, 497 
F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2007); Powell v. Alexander, 391 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004). 
Other sanctions include: liability under federal antitrust law, e.g., Cal. Motor 
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); liability under federal 
labor law, e.g., Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983); permit denial 
or revocation, see, e.g., Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1312-13 (9th 
Cir. 1989); adverse zoning decisions, see, e.g., EJS Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 
F.3d 845, 864 n.14 (6th Cir. 2012); other official investigatory or enforcement actions, 
see, e.g., Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 547 (7th Cir. 2008); costs and attorneys’ 
fees, see, e.g., Octane Fitness, LLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1755; and retaliatory bad-faith counter-
litigation or prosecution, see, e.g., Hinds v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 188 F. Supp. 2d 
664, 669-70 (N.D. Tex. 2002). Much of the disagreement about the right’s scope has 
been internal to this purely negative framework, concerning the circumstances, if any, 
under which the state can legitimately punish petitioning activity. Compare the 
majority and concurring opinions in BE & K Construction Co., 536 U.S. at 516; 
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that the right to petition is limited in all cases to this purely negative, 
procedural right: the right to petition means only and always the right 
to ask for redress — never to obtain it — even when a person petitions 
a court to enforce legal rights and redress legal injuries.14 I call this 
assumption the supplicatory interpretation of the Petition Clause. In 
this article, I present an alternative reading, which I call the remedial 
interpretation: that the right to petition includes the limited right of a 
person who suffers legal injury (or a sufficient threat thereof) to 
obtain a minimally adequate remedy from the courts. In short, I argue 
that the First Amendment guarantees a right to a remedy. 
The Article proceeds in two parts. Part I presents the case for a First 
Amendment right to a remedy, as a matter of history, text, and 
precedent. First, I explore the historical roots of the Petition Clause. I 
emphasize a point that has been overlooked in Petition Clause 
scholarship to date: that the original codification of a right to petition 
in Magna Carta was framed in strong mandatory, not supplicatory 
terms. And, while other scholars assume that the English petitionary 
right is the original antecedent to the Petition Clause, I argue that its 
 
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. at 49; and California Motor Transport 
Co., 404 U.S. at 508. 
 14 See, e.g., Minn. Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) 
(“Nothing in the First Amendment . . . suggests that the rights to speak, associate, and 
petition require government policymakers to listen or respond to individual 
communications on public issues.”); Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 
441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979) (commission’s refusal to respond to employee grievances did 
not violate the First Amendment); EJS Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845, 
864 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[I]n all of the cases addressing meaningful access, the focus is 
on the access to the court, not the court’s response or behavior upon receiving the 
petition.”). For example, one of the nation’s leading Petition Clause scholars, Carol 
Rice Andrews, concludes that the right to petition the courts “is very narrow: it 
protects a person’s right only to file winning claims within the court’s jurisdiction.” 
Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8, at 562 (emphasis added). According to 
Andrews, the right to petition the courts is mostly a negative right to be free from 
unjustified governmental retaliation or suppression; the only positive duty the right 
imposes is the limited obligation to receive a lawsuit in the minimal sense of 
permitting its filing. See id. at 646-47. But according to Andrews, at the moment of 
filing, the work of the Petition Clause concludes and Due Process takes over to 
regulate how the court responds to the filed petition. Id. at 633-34, 646-47. In short, 
Andrews defines the court access right narrowly as a procedural right of initial access 
to the judicial forum. But see, e.g., Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right to 
Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 142-43 (1986); 
Pfander, supra note 8, at 905 & n.22 (citing scholarship); Spanbauer, supra note 8, at 
33. Most have assumed the right is both exclusively procedural and exclusively 
negative. Other have explored possibility that the right to petition includes a positive 
procedural component, imposing affirmative duties on government to receive, 
consider, or respond to certain petitions. 
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origins must be traced both to the English petitionary right and to the 
English right to a remedy. I explain that the English legal system 
distinguished between the “right to petition” the King and “the right 
to a remedy” from the courts because of structural features of the 
British monarchy that the Framers rejected, but these two English 
rights worked in tandem to ensure redress of legal injuries. The 
Framers adapted these interlocking rights to the American political 
system by merging them into a unified right to “petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances,” which included the right of 
legally injured persons to obtain a meaningful remedy from the 
separate and coequal judicial branch.15 
Next, I closely analyze the text and drafting history of the Petition 
Clause. I explain that the word “petition” is a semantically polysemous 
and pragmatically ambiguous term: Whether it is best understood to 
be supplicatory or mandatory depends on contextual factors. I point to 
four contextual features of the text and its drafting history that favor a 
mandatory connotation: (1) the unprecedented redefinition of the 
petition recipient — in stark contrast to all previous and extant 
codifications and to the original language proposed — from 
“Legislature” to “Government”; (2) the explicit specification of the 
goal as “a redress of grievances”; (3) the separate enumeration of the 
right to petition and the freedom of speech; and (4) the proposal and 
consideration of more explicit right-to-a-remedy language by state 
ratifying conventions and the U.S. Senate. Through this analysis, I 
problematize the two primary assumptions made by proponents of the 
supplicatory interpretation: that the word “petition” has a single, 
unambiguous, supplicatory meaning synonymous with “beg,” 
“beseech,” or “supplicate”; and that the enumeration of “the right to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances” rather than “the 
right to a redress of grievances” necessarily confines the right to one of 
 
 15 Note that the Petition Clause, like the First Amendment as a whole, originally 
applied only to the federal government, and was only incorporated against the states 
after Reconstruction via the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the First Amendment 
directly prohibits federal abridgment of the right to petition the federal courts, and 
through the doctrine of incorporation prohibits state abridgement of the right to 
petition state or federal courts. The Court has recognized this implicitly, but not 
explicitly. Compare Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379 (2011) (applying 
the Petition Clause to conduct of a state’s local political subdivision) with McDonald 
v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 at n.12 (2010) (citing cases incorporating every 
First Amendment right except the right to petition). A complete analysis of the 
present-day right to petition would consider Reconstruction, and how the meaning of 
the Petition Clause may have been modified by the Due Process, Equal Protection, and 
Privileges & Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. That project lies 
beyond the scope of this article. 
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supplication. I also explain why a purely supplicatory interpretation of 
the Petition Clause would render it superfluous in light of the Speech 
Clause. 
Finally, I show how the remedial interpretation is consonant with 
prior Supreme Court cases. In Chisholm v. Georgia,16 and Marbury v. 
Madison,17 cases decided in the decade following the ratification of the 
First Amendment, there was clear judicial recognition of a right to a 
remedy, linked to a right to petition the courts in the new American 
constitutional order. More modern lines of doctrine also provide 
substantial — and often-undervalued — support for the principle that 
the Petition Clause entails a remedial component for legal petitions. 
In Part II, I explain the practical significance of recognizing the 
remedial Petition Clause. I begin the task of translating the remedial 
theory into a coherent doctrinal framework by sketching a tentative 
tiered scrutiny approach to remedial access claims that flows naturally 
from other areas of First Amendment jurisprudence. Neutral time, 
place, and manner limitations on remedial access would enjoy judicial 
deference. Limitations based on the content of a lawsuit, the identity 
of the plaintiff, or the governmental status of the defendant would 
trigger heighted scrutiny. This tiered scrutiny approach would impose 
meaningful constraints on remedy denial, but it would not upend 
every rule that affects remedial access. It would not eliminate the gap 
between right and remedy, but it would narrow it, and demand 
justification for it. This doctrinal framework could have numerous, 
significant real-world implications. Rules and practices vulnerable to 
challenge under my theory include congressional restrictions on 
individuals’ access to judicial remedies under the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and the 
Federal Arbitration Act; judicial refusals to reach the merits of lawsuits 
or impose remedies when applying qualified and absolute immunity 
doctrines; and state legislation capping tort damage awards.18 
 
 16 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
 17 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 18 Access to the remedial function of federal courts is also implicated by many 
rules of federal courts jurisprudence, including the availability of and limitations on 
federal court jurisdiction, Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 
545 U.S. 308 (2005), the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 statutory cause of action, Monroe v. Pape, 
365 U.S. 167 (1961), partially overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of 
N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and the Bivens implied cause of action, Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971). Some 
of these rules reflect Supreme Court interpretations of federal constitutional 
provisions such as the Eleventh Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI, and Article III, 
U.S. CONST. art. III., § 1 (Judicial Vesting Clause), U.S. CONST. art. III., § 2 (“Cases” 
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Ultimately, I conclude that the history, text and judicial 
interpretation of the Petition Clause all support my proposed remedial 
interpretation.19 
The proper interpretation of the Petition Clause will not be settled 
by any one article or scholar — it will emerge from a process of 
scholarly and judicial inquiry over time. My goal here is not to end the 
debate about whether the Petition Clause includes a right to a remedy, 
but to introduce a new perspective. I readily acknowledge that the case 
for a Petition Clause right to a remedy — like any competing 
interpretation — is imperfect and subject to valid critique. My 
objective is to share a novel but plausible theory of the Petition 
Clause, and to invite others to examine and build upon it. 
I. THEORY 
This section makes the case for a First Amendment right to a 
remedy as a matter of history, text, and precedent. Subpart A argues 
that the First Amendment right “to petition the Government” 
represents the merger of the historically related rights to petition the 
King and to obtain a remedy from the courts. Subpart B argues that the 
remedial theory best accounts for the precise language and drafting 
history of the Petition Clause and the First Amendment as a whole. 
 
and “Controversies” provisions and Appellate Jurisdiction Clause). Others, like 
doctrines of prudential standing, absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity, and 
qualified immunity for executive branch officials, do not. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) (prudential standing); Camreta v. 
Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (2011) (qualified immunity); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 
(1978) (absolute judicial immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) 
(absolute prosecutorial immunity). 
Ultimately, courts must synthesize the First Amendment right to a remedy with 
federal courts jurisprudence, which would require an intratextual analysis of the First 
Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, and Article III, along with the Suspension 
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I., § 9, the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. XI. and the 
Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Two competing principles will 
inform this synthesis. The first is that the First Amendment right to a remedy is not 
absolute, and permits remedy denial if adequately justified. Constitutional limitations 
expressed in Article III and the Eleventh Amendment would constitute such 
justification. On the other hand, when trying to figure out the proper scope of Article 
III and the Eleventh Amendment, courts must recognize that there is a competing 
constitutional imperative contained within the Petition Clause that favors a narrow 
construction of these limitations on federal court jurisdiction. Beyond these 
preliminary observations, a complete intratextual synthesis lies beyond the scope of 
this paper, but I hope to pursue this project in subsequent articles.  
 19 See infra Conclusion. 
  
2017] The First Amendment Right to a Remedy 1751 
Subpart C shows that this remedial theory enjoys substantial support 
from both Founding-era and modern Petition Clause case law. 
A. Historical Antecedents 
The Petition Clause protects “the right of the people . . . to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.”20 In analyzing the 
historical roots of this constitutional protection, Petition Clause 
scholars have focused their attention on the English right to petition 
the King and, later, Parliament, tracing that right from its earliest 
origins in the centuries preceding its first codification in Magna Carta 
to the time of the Founding of the United States.21 Another set of 
scholars, attempting to understand state constitutional provisions 
codifying a right to a remedy, have separately traced the historical 
development over this same time period of the English right to a 
remedy from the courts.22 These two lines of historical inquiry have 
been treated as distinct projects, rather than elements of an 
interrelated whole. 
However, as I will describe in more detail in Part I.B, the text of the 
Petition Clause modified the traditional right to petition in an important 
way: it expanded the recipient subclause of the right and in so doing 
expanded the right’s scope. Whereas previous codifications protected 
the right to petition the King, Parliament, or the Legislature,23 the new 
American guarantee protected the right to petition the Government24 — 
thus encompassing petitions to the courts. I argue that this substantive 
textual modification mandates a wider lens for the historical inquiry. 
The historical antecedent to the Petition Clause is not only the English 
right to petition, but also the English right to a remedy, which governed 
petitions addressed to courts. 
These two English rights predate modern separation of powers. 
They developed at a time when executive, legislative, and judicial 
powers were diffused across multiple institutional actors in ways that 
were complex and evolving. In this era of blended or conflated 
powers, the English petitionary and remedial rights were differentiated 
 
 20 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 21 See, e.g., Higginson, supra note 14, at 142-49; Mark, supra note 8, at 2163-70; 
Spanbauer, supra note 8, at 22-33.  
 22 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 4, at 1009-20; Koch, supra note 4, at 349-57; 
Phillips, supra note 3, 1319-24; Schuman, supra note 4, at 1199-01.  
 23 See infra Section I.B.4.a (discussing the intention underlying “the government” 
in the Petition Clause of the Constitution). 
 24 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).  
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primarily according to the institutional recipient of the petition, rather 
than the function of the petition. The right to petition constrained the 
King and Parliament, and the right to a remedy constrained the courts. 
This separate treatment according to institutional recipient made sense 
in light of features of the English political system that the Founders 
decisively rejected — the sovereignty of the King, the inferiority of the 
courts, and the subjecthood of the citizenry. Yet there was substantial 
overlap between the function of petitions to the King or Parliament 
and petitions to the courts. As English petitioning practice emerged 
and evolved, there was substantial conflation between petitions 
addressed to the different institutional bodies. Courts, as they 
developed, received legal petitions designed to redress individual legal 
grievances. But so, too, did the King and Parliament. Some petitions 
addressed to the King and Parliament were in function political 
petitions: they sought a change in or clarification of the law. Others, 
however, were in function legal petitions, which sought to enforce 
extant legal rights. 
Thus the “right to a remedy” concerned legal petitions directed to 
courts; the “right to petition” concerned both legal and political 
petitions directed to the King and to Parliament. The American 
codification of a right to petition the Government encompassed both of 
these petitioning traditions, including legal and political petitions 
addressed to all three branches of government in the new 
constitutional order. 
Expanding the historical lens of my analysis to include both the 
English “right to a remedy” and the English “right to petition” bears 
significant consequences. Conventional accounts of petitioning practice 
that define petitioning with atextual institutional constraints implicitly 
limit the scope of their inquiry in four related ways: (1) they focus 
narrowly on a subset of institutional petition recipients that excludes 
courts, based on recipient subclauses rejected by the Framers;25 which 
leads to (2) overemphasizing political petitions and underemphasizing 
legal petitions — sometimes to the point of ignoring legal petitions 
completely, even those addressed to the political branches; which leads 
to (3) conceptualizing the function of petitioning exclusively in terms 
of participation, political responsiveness, and information provision, 
and erasing the distinct function of enforcing pre-existing rights; and 
(4) emphasizing the supplicatory, discretionary character of the 
 
 25 See, e.g., Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2503 (2011) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]here is abundant historical evidence 
that ‘Petitions’ were directed to the executive and legislative branches of government, 
not to the courts.”). 
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petitioning relationship and concluding that the right to petition was 
just a negative right to be free from retaliation but not a positive 
entitlement to a favorable response.26 In other words, by limiting the 
inquiry in terms of (1) recipient, (2) goal, and (3) function, they 
(4) limit the scope of the right. 
My approach, consistent with the textual and functional innovation 
of the First Amendment, addresses each of these four limitations, by 
recognizing that (1) courts must be counted among the recipients of 
historical petitions; (2) petitions to the King and Parliament included 
both political and legal petitions; (3) legal petitions served a distinct 
rights-protecting function irrespective of recipient; and (4) legal 
petitions involved claims of remedial right and imposition of 
corresponding remedial duties upon the petition’s recipient. 
In relating the history of English petitioning practice, I necessarily 
provide an extremely brief summary of a vast historical record that has 
been exhaustively explored by other scholars. My primary purpose is 
not to capture each detail of centuries of English history, but to 
illuminate what more detailed treatments sometimes obscure: the co-
evolution of English remedial and petitionary practices which laid the 
foundation for a new American right. 
1. The Rise of English Petitionary and Remedial Rights 
Scholars trace the right to a remedy from the courts and the right to 
petition the King to separate provisions of Magna Carta codified eight 
centuries ago.27 But the practices of petitioning the King and accessing 
remedies from his courts developed centuries before.28 Indeed, Magna 
 
 26 Some argue there is a duty to receive, consider, or respond to petitions. See 
Higginson, supra note 14, at 142-43, 155; Hodgkiss, supra note 8, at 572-73, but 
nobody argues there is a right to a favorable response to legal petitions. Andrews, 
Right of Access, supra note 8, at 644 (“[N]o one contends that the mere right to 
petition guarantees that the government will grant the petitioner’s request.”). 
 27 Scholars recognize Chapter 40 of the 1215 charter as the original codification of 
the right to a remedy. See Heyman, supra note 6, at 535; Hoffman, supra note 4, at 
1006 n.4; Koch, supra note 4, at 341; Phillips, supra note 3, at 1319-20; Schuman, 
supra note 4, at 1199; Thomas, supra note 6, at 1638; Shannon M. Roesler, Comment, 
The Kansas Remedy by Due Course of Law Provision: Defining a Right to a Remedy, 47 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 655, 657-58 (1999). Scholars recognize Chapter 61 of the 1215 charter as 
the original codification of the right to petition. See Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2499 
(citing WILLIAM MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF 
KING JOHN 467 (rev. 2d ed., 1958); Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8, at 596 
n.135; Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 NW. U. L. 
REV. 739, 746 (1999); Smith, supra note 13, at 1155.  
 28 Koch, supra note 4, at 351-53; Mark, supra note 8, at 2163. 
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Carta itself was the King’s response to a petition seeking redress of 
baronial grievances,29 designed in part to address dissatisfaction with 
how courts and the King had been responding to petitions.30 
In their earliest form, petitions to the King had a distinctly legal — 
and specifically appellate — character: they sought resolution of a 
claim, usually related to a private dispute over property rights,31 which 
an inferior tribunal had already adjudicated.32 These appeals reflected 
a dynamic of supplication rather than entitlement.33 In this way, early 
petitioning practice served as a mechanism through which parties 
dissatisfied with judgments of the ordinary judicial system could seek 
extraordinary, discretionary relief from the King himself. It developed 
as judicial power shifted from local feudal courts to a unified system of 
royal courts.34 
With that shift came increasing concern about how adequately royal 
courts remedied legal injuries.35 The barons intended to use Magna 
Carta to redress these abuses and to ensure that justice would be 
dispensed based not on royal whim but on the “law of the land.”36 
Magna Carta, promulgated over eight centuries ago,37 codified the 
right to a remedy and the right to petition in separate provisions.38 
 
 29 Smith, supra note 13, at 1155. 
 30 See infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 31 Mark, supra note 8, at 2163 n.26. 
 32 Id. at 2163.  
 33 See id. 
 34 In the centuries before Magna Carta, feudal justice was dispensed by a 
patchwork of local courts competing for influence and fees, with most lords providing 
a court for persons residing on their land. Koch, supra note 4, at 351. Henry II, who 
ruled from 1154 to 1189, launched a campaign to centralize the judicial system. Id. at 
352. By the time of King John’s reign (1199–1216), the balance of judicial power had 
shifted decisively to royal courts. Id. at 352-53. 
 35 The system of royal writs was complicated and tightly controlled, denying a 
remedy to those who failed to purchase the correct writ, at a price the King could vary 
on a case-by-case basis, often in proportion to the value of the claim or the wealth of 
the petitioner. Id. at 352-53. 
 36 Id. at 353. 
 37 The original Magna Carta was issued by King John in 1215, but the final version 
was issued in 1225. In the intervening decade, King John died, his minor son (King 
Henry III) ascended to the throne, issued three abridged versions, came of age, and 
then finally issued the 1225 version, which became the basis for all subsequent 
reaffirmations by later Plantagenet and Lancastrian monarchs. See id. at 354-56 (citing 
A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE, MAGNA CARTA AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 8 (1968); WILLIAM S. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA, A 
COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 45-46, 139, 141-43, 145-154, 376-
83, 385, 386, 396 (2d ed. 1914); WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, MAGNA CARTA, LEGEND AND 
LEGACY 98, 100-02, 104, 105, 107, 112-16, 241 (1965)). The 1225 version differed 
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The right to a remedy from the courts was codified in Chapter 40 of 
the original 1215 charter and read as follows: “To no one will we sell, 
to no one deny or delay right or justice.”39 This language — 
recognized as the first codification of the right to a remedy40 — was a 
capstone provision in a document designed in significant part to 
secure a judicial system that would respect and enforce individual 
rights.41 We can readily trace this language from its codification in 
Magna Carta to its elaboration by Sir Edward Coke in his Second 
Institutes,42 to Blackstone’s restatement in his Commentaries,43 and 
ultimately to state constitutional provisions operative today.44 
 
from the original 1215 versions in two respects relevant here: (1) while the 1215 
version codified due process rights in chapter 39 and a right to a remedy in chapter 
40, the 1225 version combined these two chapters into a single chapter 29; and (2) 
the baronial right to petition codified in Chapter 61 was omitted from the 1225 
version. Yet the baronial right to petition continued in practice, evolving into a 
universal right to petition. See infra Section I.A.2. For clarity, I refer to the 1215 
version, with the understanding that the critical inquiry here is not which rights were 
codified by which versions of Magna Carta, but rather how Magna Carta informed the 
subsequent development of petitionary and remedial rights, as practiced and codified, 
first in England, and then in America.  
 38 In this Article, I refer to the English translation of the 1215 version of Magna 
Carta available through the British Library. MAGNA CARTA (Eng. 1215) (translated by 
British Library), http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation. 
Other scholars also rely on this version. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an 
Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3107 n.59 (2015); Vincent R. Johnson, The 
Ancient Magna Carta and the Modern Rule of Law: 1215 to 2015, 47 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 4 n.8 
(2015); see also HOWARD, supra note 37, at 42. Other translations exist — notably those 
used in J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA (2d ed., 1992), and MCKECHNIE, supra note 37.  
 39 Chapter 29 of the 1215 charter, addressing abuses in the criminal justice 
system, was the precursor to due process. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2132 
(2015); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: 
Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 
585, 596-97 (2009). When King Henry III reaffirmed and reissued Magna Carta a 
decade later, Chapters 39 and 40 had been combined into Chapter 29. See Koch, supra 
note 4, at 356. 
 40 See supra note 27.  
 41 Other provisions in Magna Carta complemented Chapter 40 in securing an 
accessible, competent royal court system that would ably perform its function of 
judicial remediation and rights enforcement. See MAGNA CARTA, chs. 18-19, 24, 45 
(Eng. 1215). Other provisions recognize that the King and his predecessors had 
violated individuals’ legal rights and guaranteed restoration of these rights and “full 
justice” for these grievances (either immediately or upon conclusion of the crusades). 
See id. at chs. 52-53, 57. 
 42 See SIR EDWARD COKE, 2 INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 45, 55 (1642); 
Roesler, supra note 27, at 657-58 & n.18 (quoting Coke). 
 43 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *32-33. 
 44 See Phillips, supra note 3, at 1310-11 (describing state constitutional 
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Separate from the right to a remedy provision, there is another 
provision of the 1215 charter — Chapter 61 — that scholars and 
courts unanimously recognize as the original codification of the right 
to petition.45 But Petition Clause jurisprudence and scholarship fail to 
appreciate the remedial and mandatory character of this provision.46 
This right to petition is in fact a right to a remedy. Chapter 61 of the 
1215 charter — the baronial right to petition — reads, in part, as 
follows: 
If we . . . offend in any respect against any man, or transgress 
any of the articles of the peace or of this security, and the 
offence is made known to four of the . . . twenty-five barons, 
they shall come to us . . . to declare it and claim immediate 
redress. If we . . . make no redress within forty days . . . the 
four barons shall refer the matter to the rest of the twenty-five 
barons, who may distrain upon and assail us in every way 
possible, with the support of the whole community of the 
land, by seizing our castles, lands, possessions, or anything 
else saving only our own person and those of the queen and 
our children, until they have secured such redress as they have 
determined upon. Having secured the redress, they may then 
resume their normal obedience to us.47 
This baronial right to petition was not supplicatory but remedial — 
its purpose was to preserve the legal status quo established by Magna 
Carta.48 Chapter 61 used the term “redress” four times49 and specified 
what would happen if the redress was not promptly supplied: the 
 
provisions). 
 45 See supra note 27.  
 46 See infra notes 54, 55 and accompanying text.  
 47 MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61 (Eng. 1215). In this Article, I use the British Library 
translation of the Latin text, as do other legal scholars outside the Petition Clause 
context. English Translation of Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR., http://www.bl.uk/magna-
carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation (last visited Dec. 14, 2016); see HOWARD, 
supra note 37, at 42; Jackson, supra note 38, at 3107 n.59; Johnson, supra note 38, at 
14. As I will discuss further below, other scholars use different translations of the 
Latin text.  
 48 McKechnie describes the baronial right to petition as the “machinery for 
enforcing all that precedes it,” “the only executive clause of the Charter, the sole 
constitutional machinery,” “the procedure devised for enforcing the Charter,” and the 
“procedure for redressing grievances.” MCKECHNIE, supra note 37, at 468.  
 49 MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61 (Eng. 1215) (“to declare it and claim immediate 
redress”); id. (“If we . . . make no redress within forty days . . . . “); id. (“until they 
have secured such redress as they have determined upon”); id. (“Having secured the 
redress, they may then resume their normal obedience to us.”). 
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barons would be relieved of their obligation of loyalty to the King and 
legally entitled to wage war against him.50 Only when the King 
redressed their grievances would war end and loyalty resume. To make 
this threat of war credible, Chapter 61 subsequently provides that 
Any man who so desires may take an oath to obey the 
commands of the twenty-five barons for the achievement of 
these ends, and to join with them in assailing us to the utmost 
of his power. We give public and free permission to take this 
oath to any man who so desires, and at no time will we 
prohibit any man from taking it. Indeed, we will compel any of 
our subjects who are unwilling to take it to swear it at our 
command.51 
Thus the baronial right to petition was not a mere procedural right, 
but a substantive entitlement to redress. The petitions it contemplated 
were not political petitions seeking discretionary policy change, but 
legal petitions seeking enforcement of pre-existing legal rights. 
Moreover, it established an explicitly mandatory relationship between 
petitioner, recipient, and this rights-enforcing goal. The mandatory 
redress of the baronial right to petition was the mechanism Magna 
Carta selected to secure the underlying rights it established.52 For this 
reason, Chapter 61 is also recognized as a precursor to the right of 
revolution.53 
 
 50 See MCKECHNIE, supra note 37, at 468 (“John conferred upon twenty-five of his 
enemies a legal right to organize rebellion, whenever in their opinion he had broken 
any one of the provisions of Magna Carta. Violence might be legally used against him, 
until he redressed their alleged grievances ‘to their own satisfaction.’”); id. (calling this 
committee of twenty-five barons a “Committee of Rebellion”); see also SAMUEL 
RAWSON GARDINER, A STUDENT’S HISTORY OF ENGLAND 184 (1892) (describing these 
barons as “a permanent organization for making war against the King.”). 
 51 MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61 (Eng. 1215). 
 52 The term “security,” or a derivative term (“secured”), is used four times, just 
like the term “redress.” Other provisions of the 1215 charter refer to Chapter 61 as the 
“clause for securing the peace.” MAGNA CARTA, ch. 52, 55 (Eng. 1215) (emphasis 
added). 
 53 See ROSCOE POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF 
LIBERTY 90 (1957) (“Th[e] idea [of a right of revolution] has a long history. Chapter 
61 of Magna Carta recognizes a right of revolution or rebellion and provides for an 
orderly exercise of it . . . .”); George Anastaplo, Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States: A Commentary, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 845 (1992) (noting “the great 
right of revolution dramatically exercised in Magna Carta”); Lawson & Seidman, 
supra note 27, at 746 (“[T]he barons were given what amounts to a legal right of 
revolution.”); Jordan J. Paust, The Human Right to Participate in Armed Revolution and 
Related Forms of Social Violence: Testing the Limits of Permissibility, 32 EMORY L.J. 545, 
561 n.67 (1983). The logic of the baronial right to petition is also reflected in the 
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Petition Clause jurisprudence and scholarship recognize Chapter 61 
as the original codification of the right to petition, but characterize 
Chapter 61 in procedural, supplicatory terms, by translating the Latin 
text as guaranteeing the right to “ask” for redress,54 and then omitting 
or de-emphasizing the latter portion of the Chapter addressing what 
happens if the King fails to timely provide that redress.55 
The relevant Latin word — petent56 — is a conjugated form of the 
verb peto,57 which has multiple related meanings — some more 
supplicatory, some more obligatory. Peto could be interpreted as to 
“beg, beseech, ask, request, desire, entreat.”58 But it could alternatively 
be interpreted as to “demand, seek, require,”59 or more specifically to 
“demand or claim at law, to bring an action to recover, to sue for any 
 
Declaration of Independence, a document drafted to justify to the world the Founders’ 
decision to rebel against Britain. After enumerating grievances against the Crown, the 
Declaration of Independence states, “In every stage of these Oppressions We have 
Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been 
answered only by repeated injury.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 30 (U.S. 
1776); Smith, supra note 13, at 1173; Higginson, supra note 14, at 155 n.92. 
 54 See infra note 62 (citing to authorities that follow the “right to ‘ask’” 
translation). 
 55 See, e.g., Mark, supra note 8, at 2164 & n.29 (characterizing baronial petitions 
as “notifying [the King] of his failure to observe the pledges contained in the Great 
Charter,” and failing to quote the portion of Chapter 61 describing legal consequence 
of royal failure to timely provide redress (emphasis added)). In one of her four articles 
identifying Chapter 61 as the first codification of the right to petition, Carol Rice 
Andrews acknowledges that if the King failed to redress a baronial petition, “the 
barons could seize the King’s property until the wrong ‘has been redressed.’” Andrews, 
Right of Access, supra note 8, at 639 n.279 (quoting HOLT, supra note 38, at 471). But 
the relevant language is not quoted, no mention is made of the legal right to rebellion, 
the provision is characterized as imposing only a “duty to respond,” id., and petent is 
translated as ask in a separate footnote. Compare Carol Rice Andrews, Motive 
Restrictions on Court Access: A First Amendment Challenge, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 665, 669 & 
n.13 (2000) [hereinafter Motive Restrictions] (describing the petitionary right as a 
“procedure” by which barons could “ask” for redress (quoting HOLT, supra note 38, at 
471)), with Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8, at 639 n.279 (“[T]he King 
apparently did have a duty to respond under the original 1215 Magna Carta: the 
barons had a right to petition the King for redress of the King’s breaches of the other 
provisions of the Magna Carta, and, if he did not, the barons could seize the King’s 
property until the wrong ‘has been redressed.’” (quoting HOLT, supra note 38, at 471)). 
 56 The critical Latin phrase is: “proponentes nobis excessum; petent ut excessum 
illum sine dilacione faciamus emendari.” Magna Carta, LATIN LIBR. (emphasis added), 
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/magnacarta.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2016). 
 57 Peto, OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY (P. G. W. Glare ed., 1st ed. 1982). Petent is the 
third-person plural, future, indicative form of the verb. The present infinitive is petere. Id. 
 58 Peto, A LATIN DICTIONARY (Charlton T. Lewis & Charles Short eds., 1879), 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0059:entry=peto. 
 59 Id. 
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thing.”60 Sir James Clarke Holt, an English medieval historian 
renowned for his work on Magna Carta, favored the supplicatory 
reading and translated petent as “ask.”61 Petition Clause scholars in 
turn have favored the Holt translation.62 But other translations of 
Magna Carta translate petent as “claim”63 or “demand.”64 Legal 
 
 60 Id. 
 61 See HOLT, Manuscript Cii of Magna Carta, in MAGNA CARTA, supra note 38, at 
448, 469-71 (“[The] barons . . . shall bring it to our notice and ask that we have it 
redressed without delay.”) (translation from text compiled by C. Bemont, Chartes des 
libertes anglaises (1892)). 
 62 See, e.g., Carol Rice Andrews, After BE & K: The “Difficult Constitutional 
Question” of Defining the First Amendment Right to Petition Courts, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 
1299, 1303 n.14 (2003) (relying on Holt’s translation of petent to ask); Carol Rice 
Andrews, Jones v. Clinton: A Study in Politically Motivated Suits, Rule 11, and the First 
Amendment, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1, 49 n.214 (2001) (same); Andrews, Motive 
Restrictions, supra note 55, at 669 n.13 (same); Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8, 
at 598 n.135 (same); Mark, supra note 8, at 2164 n.29 (same). Courts have also 
favored this interpretation. See, e.g., San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 443 
n.22 (3d Cir. 1994), abrogated by Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379 
(2011); Lahmann v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 121 P.3d 671, 680 n.6 
(Or. 2005) (quoting SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 21 (Richard L. Perry, ed., 1959)). 
 63 See, e.g., CLAIRE BREAY, MAGNA CARTA: MANUSCRIPTS AND MYTHS 54 (2002) 
(translating “petent” as “claim”); Shruti Rajagopalan, Magna Carta Revisited: 
Parchment, Guns, and Constitutional Order, 47 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. S53, S58 (2016) 
(same); English Translation of Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR., http://www.bl.uk/magna-
carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation (last visited Dec. 14, 2016) (“[T]o 
declare it and claim immediate redress.”). Claire Breay leads the medieval manuscripts 
section of the British Library, which has had in its repository since 1753 two of the 
four surviving original manuscripts of the 1215 Magna Carta. See Making History: Four 
Original Surviving Magna Carta Manuscripts Are Brought Together for the First Time, 
BRIT. LIBR. (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.bl.uk/press-releases/2015/february/four-
original-surviving-magna-carta-manuscripts-are-brought-together-for-the-first-time; 
see also People: Claire Breay, BRIT. LIBR. (Dec. 29, 2015), https://www.bl.uk/people/ 
experts/clairebreay. Claire Breay also serves as a co-investigator for the Magna Carta 
Project. Personnel: Historical Researchers, MAGNA CARTA PROJECT, http:// 
magnacartaresearch.org/about/personnel (last visited Dec. 15, 2016).  
 64 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW 397 (Daniel 
Barstow Magraw, Andrea Martinez & Roy E. Brownell II eds., 2014); THOMAS WOOD 
STEVENS, MAGNA CARTA: A PAGEANT DRAMA 70 (1928) (“declaring the offence, and shall 
demand speedy amends for the same.”); Magna Carta 1215: Suffix A, MAGNA CARTA 
PROJECT, http://magnacarta.cmp.uea.ac.uk/read/magna_carta_1215/Suffix_A (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2016) (noting the barons’ duty to “set[] forth the transgression, and 
demand that we have it reformed without delay”). The Magna Carta Project is a 
collaboration between the British Library and British universities launched to freely 
disseminate “texts, translations and expert commentaries” on Magna Carta in 
preparation for its 800th anniversary. See About the Magna Carta Project, MAGNA 
CARTA PROJECT, http://magnacarta.cmp.uea.ac.uk/about/aboutproject (last visited Dec. 
15, 2016). The Magna Carta Project refers to Chapter 61 as Suffix A.  
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scholarship outside the Petition Clause context favors these more 
obligatory translations and characterizes Chapter 61 in more 
mandatory, remedial terms.65 That Chapter 61 is interpreted in 
procedural, supplicatory terms when analyzed in conjunction with the 
Petition Clause suggests the power of the prevailing supplicatory 
framing of the First Amendment right to petition. This may be a case 
where modern framing is informing our reading of historical practice, 
rather than historical practice informing our interpretation of the 
Petition Clause. The better reading of petent is surely “claim” or 
“demand,” because Chapter 61 clearly contemplates the barons 
presenting demands, not mere requests. This textual ambiguity 
regarding the Latin term petent in Magna Carta is analogous to the 
textual ambiguity regarding the English term “petition” in the First 
Amendment. For while some translate petent as “ask,” and others 
translate petent as “claim” or “demand,” a third set of scholars simply 
translate petent as “petition.”66 This interpretive dissensus powerfully 
demonstrates that the verb “petition,” like its Latin ancestor peto, is an 
instance of polysemy, where a single term bears multiple distinct but 
related meanings.67 
Magna Carta thus contained two related but distinct provisions: 
Chapter 40’s right to a remedy from the courts, and Chapter 61’s 
baronial right to petition the King. Note that the difference between 
 
 65 See, e.g., Sally E. Hadden, Magna Carta for the Masses: An Analysis of Eighteenth-
Century Americans’ Growing Familiarity with the Great Charter in Newspapers, 94 N.C. 
L. REV. 1681, 1721 (2016) (“The right of petition that men believed was protected in 
Magna Carta was more correctly the right to ‘claim immediate redress’ should the king 
give offense (chapter 61) . . . .” (quoting DAVID CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA 44-45 
(2015))); Robert E. Hall, Remonstrance — Citizen’s Weapon Against Government’s 
Indifference, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1427 (1990) (“Chapter 61 insured the enforcement 
of the rights granted by establishing an enforceable right of petition.” (citing 
MCKECHNIE, supra note 37, at 545, 547)); Del Wright, Jr., Bogus Refunds & Bad 
Penalties: The Feckless and Fixable Refund Penalty System, 48 AKRON L. REV. 547, 583 
n.156 (2015) (barons had a duty to “declare [the offence] and claim immediate 
redress”) (translation source unclear); Steven M. Richman, Magna Carta — Its Essence 
and Effect on International Law, N.J. LAW. MAG., June 2015, at 5, 6 (“Chapter 61 (Suffix 
A) provided the remedies section, so to speak, setting forth a procedure for remedying 
default by the king . . . .”). 
 66 See, e.g., RANDY J. HOLLAND, MAGNA CARTA: MUSE & MENTOR 246 
(2014) (“[L]aying open the grievance, [the barons] shall petition to have it redressed 
without delay.”); MCKECHNIE, supra note 37, at 467 (“[L]aying the transgression 
before us, [the barons shall] petition to have that transgression redressed without 
delay.”); RAY STRINGHAM, MAGNA CARTA: FOUNTAINHEAD OF FREEDOM 241 (1966) 
(“[M]aking known to us the excess committed, [the barons shall] petition that we 
cause that excess to be redressed without delay.”).  
 67 I return to this critical point in my textual analysis. Infra Section I.B.1.  
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these two rights was not that the right to petition was procedural while 
the right to a remedy was substantive. Both were substantive, 
obligatory, and remedial in character; both provided mechanisms to 
protect other underlying rights, and both emphasized a speedy 
remedy.68 If anything, the right to petition was more remedial than the 
right to a remedy because only the baronial right to petition entailed a 
corresponding legal right of rebellion if the King failed to provide 
redress. The difference between the two rights concerned who could 
exercise them and whom they constrained. The right to a remedy was 
universal and individual. Any single person could exercise it. The 
right to petition, however, was baronial and representative. Only 
selected barons, acting together, could exercise it. Though both 
provisions use the royal “we,” the right to a remedy was intended and 
understood only to constrain the royal courts within their limited 
sphere of operation, while the right to petition directly constrained the 
King. The right to a remedy was designed to redress violations by 
neighbors, while the right to petition was designed to redress 
transgressions by the King or his agents. 
These distinctions reflected the power dynamics inherent in the 
relationships between the King, the barons, the courts, and the people. 
The courts were subordinate to the King and their power was limited. 
For that reason, the right to a remedy was inadequate for the barons 
— they wanted direct access to the King. The barons, who could 
withhold taxes or rebel, posed the real political threat to the King, and 
they therefore enjoyed greater remedial rights. In terms of Albert 
Hirschman’s framework of voice, exit, and loyalty,69 Magna Carta’s 
two-tiered remedial system, with a baronial right to petition stronger 
than the universal right to a remedy from the courts, reflected the 
greater threat of exit posed by barons as opposed to common 
subjects.70 
 
 68 Compare MAGNA CARTA, ch. 40 (Eng. 1215) (“To no one will we sell, to no one 
deny or delay right or justice.” (emphasis added)), with MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61 (Eng. 
1215) (“[The barons] shall come to us . . . to declare it and claim immediate redress. If 
we . . . make no redress within forty days, . . . the twenty-five barons . . . may distrain 
upon and assail us . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 69 See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO 
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (presenting influential 
framework suggesting three fundamental options available to a citizen facing 
government oppression: exit (rebellion or expatriation), voice (protest, lobbying, and 
voting) or loyalty (hopeful attachment)). 
 70 Magna Carta, and the baronial right to petition, came about because the barons, 
dissatisfied with their voice and loyalty options, elected to withhold taxes and go to 
war against the King. The barons successfully used this exit option to extract Magna 
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From this starting point, the right to petition the King and the right 
to a remedy from the courts would evolve along with the English 
political system and legal culture. The explicit quid pro quo between 
baronial loyalty and baronial rights would evolve into a broader legal 
theory of royal legitimacy predicated on the King’s protection of the 
rights of all his subjects. The expectation that the King would enforce 
rights and redress legal injuries would evolve from the explicit 
consideration for baronial loyalty to the philosophical justification for 
every subject’s allegiance to the King. As John Locke would put it four 
centuries after Magna Carta, the diminution of liberty that 
accompanies man’s departure from a state of nature is compensated for 
by the greater security afforded by government’s obligation to enforce 
natural rights.71 The right to petition the King would evolve from a 
baronial and representative right to a universal and individual right. 
From their differentiated origins, the right to petition the King and the 
right to a remedy from the courts would co-evolve into what 
Blackstone would later characterize as a tightly linked pair of 
“auxiliary subordinate”72 rights that worked in tandem to protect 
every Englishman’s primary rights to personal security, liberty and 
property. The First Amendment would complete this co-evolution by 
merging the two rights into one. 
2. The Evolution of English Petitionary and Remedial Rights 
The centuries following Magna Carta saw evolution in petitioning 
practice, in the structure of the courts, and in the King’s response to 
petitions, with the effect that remedial responses to legal petitions 
became increasingly universal, regularized, and mandatory. This 
history suggests that it is problematic to analyze petitioning practice 
based on the recipient of the petition; it must be analyzed based on the 
function of the petition. One of the key features of this evolutionary 
period was a continued conflation of powers between governmental 
 
Carta from the King as the price of their loyalty. See generally MCKECHNIE, supra note 
37. In this way, the baronial right to petition merely formalized the pre-existing 
political dynamic between the King and the barons. 
 71 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 267-68 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); see also Goldberg, supra note 6, at 541 
(discussing Locke’s contributions to social contract theory). Locke’s theory heavily 
influenced Blackstone and the Founders. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22-54 (1967); GARY ROSEN, AMERICAN COMPACT: 
JAMES MADISON AND THE PROBLEM OF FOUNDING 5, 108 n.40 (1999); Goldberg, supra 
note 6, at 547-48. 
 72 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *140-41. 
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actors: judicial powers were exercised by courts, King, and Parliament; 
quasi-judicial procedures were implemented in Parliament and by the 
King; and due to a changing court system, petitions once addressed to 
the King were later addressed to his Courts of Equity. 
In the six centuries following Magna Carta, there was a vast history 
of political petitioning concerned not with remedying legal injury or 
enforcing preexisting rights, but rather with changing the law and 
communicating the public will to the King and, later, to Parliament.73 
Such political petitions often received favorable responses, but such 
responses were not guaranteed.74 
But the analysis changes when we shift our focus to legal petitions. 
If an individual believed that someone violated his legal rights, what 
would he do? To which institutional actor would he turn? What was 
the common understanding of an individual’s second-order right to 
enforce his primary rights — in other words, to obtain a remedy for 
legal injury? 
The answers to these questions were complex and fluid. The 
procedural mechanisms for legal petitioning were multi-institutional: 
they included petitioning the courts, the King, and, later, Parliament. 
And these procedural mechanisms were also dynamic. The relevant 
institutional actors, and the manner in which they responded, 
underwent significant evolution. Consider one prominent example of 
this dynamism. In response to increasing numbers of petitions, the 
 
 73 See Mark, supra note 8, at 2166-67 (“The petitions did not recognize fine a 
priori distinctions in categories of judicial, legislative, or executive authority, nor did 
they recognize a deep theoretical gulf between public and private grievances.”). 
Special interest groups would petition the King, not to enforce preexisting legal rights, 
but to request changes in law. See Spanbauer, supra note 8, at 22-23 (“[T]he barons, as 
representatives of the nobility, were granted a personal audience with the King . . . to 
present their written petition in exchange for their promise to finance the 
government.”). Linkages — explicit and implicit — developed between the King’s 
response to these petitions and the willingness with which special interest groups 
pledged taxes and military service to the King. See id. at 22-23, 25. This dynamic of 
political petitioning may have evolved into the British Parliament. See id. at 23 n.44. 
When Parliament became institutionalized, people started petitioning Parliament as 
well. Mark, supra note 8, at 2166 n.34. The lines between political and legal petitions 
remained blurred. See id. at 2166-69. Sometimes Parliament concluded that the 
petitioner was not entitled to relief under extant law, but that the law itself should be 
changed or clarified. In this case, Parliament asked the King to change the law. 
Parliament began bundling these requests to the King, and preconditioning funds on 
adequate responses. Id. at 2167-68. This was the beginning of an institutionalized 
process of legislation. See Smith, supra note 13, at 1156. 
 74 See Mark, supra note 8, at 2170-71 (“The [seventeenth] century’s upheavals [in 
English politics] included powerful and unfavorable responses to certain 
petitions . . . .”). 
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King began referring legal, appellate petitions to his Chancellor, who 
began developing a routinized system for addressing them.75 
Eventually, this system evolved into the Chancery Court,76 which in 
turn became increasingly independent from the King.77 In this way, 
petitions once addressed directly to the King were later addressed to a 
court of equity — a court that was subject to the norm that, absent 
adequate justification, the violation of a right necessitated a remedy.78 
The multi-institutional character of legal petitioning practice 
generated procedural complexity, institutional choice, and 
institutional competition. Petitioners asserting legal grievances could 
often select among multiple fora — for example, Parliament, a court of 
law, or one of multiple courts of equity — and they made that choice 
based on an estimation, depending on the particular claim, of which 
forum would offer the most advantageous relief.79 Intense 
jurisdictional competition between different institutional recipients 
promoted receptiveness to individual petitioners. From this multi-
institutional competitive dynamic emerged a remedial imperative — 
an increasingly broad and robust recognition that, absent adequate 
justification, a meritorious legal claim triggers a petitioner’s right to a 
remedy and government’s duty to provide one. Parliament’s 
competitive institutional interest in resolving petitions developed into 
an institutional obligation to do so, particularly in the case of legal 
petitions, for which Parliament exercised quasi-judicial functions and 
adopted quasi-judicial procedures.80 Courts of law captured this 
remedial imperative in the legal maxim of ubi jus, ibi remedium — 
“where there is a right, there should be a remedy.”81 Courts of equity 
developed the analogous equitable maxim that “equity will not suffer a 
wrong without a remedy.”82 And in the centuries-long turf war waged 
between courts of law and courts of equity,83 the most fundamental 
 
 75 See Spanbauer, supra note 8, at 23-24. 
 76 Id. at 24.  
 77 See POMEROY, supra note 1, at 3-4. 
 78 Id. at 200-01 (discussing the equitable maxim that “equity will not suffer a 
wrong without a remedy”). 
 79 Mark, supra note 8, at 2168 n.50.  
 80 See id. at 2167 n.42, 2168 n.46. 
 81 Amar, Of Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 1485-86 (“Few propositions of law are as 
basic today — and were as basic and universally embraced two hundred years ago — 
as the ancient legal maxim, ubi jus, ibi remedium: Where there is a right, there should 
be a remedy.”). 
 82 POMEROY, supra note 1, at 200-01.  
 83 See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 6 
(concise 4th ed. 2012) (“The line between law and equity is largely the result of a 
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principle to emerge aligned jurisdictional scope with remedial efficacy: 
courts of equity would only intervene where the petitioner could 
demonstrate that there was no adequate remedy in the courts of law.84 
By 1642, Sir Edward Coke had elaborated upon Magna Carta’s 
protection of the right to a remedy in the following terms: 
We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man 
either justice or right. . . . And therefore, every subject of this 
realme, for injury done to him in bonis, terris, vel persona, by 
any other subject, be he ecclesiasticall, or temporall, free, or 
bond, man, or woman, old, or young, or be he outlawed, 
excommunicated, or any other without exception, may take 
his remedy by the course of the law, and have justice, and 
right for the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully 
without any deniall, and speedily without delay.85 
Six decades later, the famous case of Ashby v. White emphasized the 
reciprocity of rights and remedies: 
If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to 
vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the 
exercise or enjoyment of it; and indeed it is a vain thing to 
imagine a right without a remedy; for . . . want of right and 
want of remedy are reciprocal. . . . Where a man has but one 
remedy to come at his right, if he loses that he loses his right.86 
The remedial right extended even, in somewhat altered form, to 
petitions against the King himself. The “petition of right” emerged as a 
mechanism by which English subjects would petition the King directly 
to redress legal wrongs and ask him, as matter of mercy or conscience, 
to consent to suit in the courts of equity.87 Royal consent to suit 
became increasingly fictionalized over time, and English subjects were 
increasingly able to get a remedy from the King’s officers or even from 
 
bureaucratic fight for turf; each court took as much jurisdiction as it could get.”).  
 84 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 687, 694 (1990); Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme 
Court’s Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 212 
(2000). 
 85 SIR EDWARD COKE, SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 45, 
55 (1642). The Supreme Court has noted that Coke’s Institutes “were read in the 
American Colonies by virtually every student of law.” Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 
2133 (2015) (quoting Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 225 (1967)). 
 86 Ashby v. White (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 137.  
 87 Pfander, supra note 8, at 909. 
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the King himself.88 Chief Justice Marshall explicitly recognized this 
tight link between petitioning practice and mandatory remedies when 
he stated in Marbury v. Madison, “[i]n Great Britain the king himself is 
sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply 
with the judgment of his court.”89 As petitioning practice matured, the 
royal response to these legal petitions moved away from royal whim 
and towards regularity and rights enforcement.90 
While the English legal system distinguished between the right to a 
remedy from the courts and the right to petition the King and 
Parliament, these rights worked in tandem to vindicate legal rights in 
the English context of dynamic, multi-institutional choice and 
competition. This unified and complementary relationship between 
the English right to a remedy and the English right to petition is 
captured most explicitly in Blackstone’s Commentaries, a treatise that 
profoundly influenced the Founders.91 Blackstone described both 
rights as “auxiliary subordinate” rights, which “protect and maintain 
inviolate” the primary rights to personal security, liberty, and 
property.92 
Blackstone enumerated five “auxiliary subordinate” rights: (1) the 
constitution, powers, and privileges of Parliament; (2) the limitation 
of the King’s prerogative; (3) the right to a remedy from the courts; 
(4) the right to petition the King or either house of Parliament for the 
 
 88 See id. at 909-12 (providing a history of the types of remedies available from the 
king or the king’s officers). The famous line “the King can do no wrong,” 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *254, was both a limitation on the King’s prerogative and 
a constraint on suing the King directly instead of his ministers; it did not mean that 
the King could act with impunity, no matter how oppressive or illegal his actions. See 
Goldberg, supra note 6, at 553 n.143. For a discussion of how a First Amendment 
right to a remedy would apply to the Eleventh Amendment and non-constitutional 
governmental immunity doctrines, see supra note 18.  
 89 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
 90 See Pfander, supra note 8, at 909-21 (describing the evolution for different types 
of remedies). 
 91 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 226 
(1998) (“Even more significant, members of the Thirty-ninth Congress regularly 
linked the Bill of Rights with the classic common-law rights of individuals exemplified 
in Blackstone . . . .”); ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 16 (1975) (“No one could avoid the influence of Blackstone. Even 
Jefferson, distrusting the commentator’s politics, had to concede that the work 
excelled in its lucid, almost too easy, exposition of the common law.”); Goldberg, 
supra note 6, at 550-51, 560 (“With certain heresies excised, the Commentaries 
provided the basic text for late-colonial and early-American legal education and 
practice.”).  
 92 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *136, *137-39. 
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redress of grievances; and (5) the right to bear arms.93 Blackstone’s last 
three rights are conceptually related. The interlocking rights to a 
remedy, to petition, and to bear arms reflected the same political logic 
of voice and exit that animated the baronial right to petition in the 
original charter of 1215.94 They were based on a conception of the 
political order that linked the legitimacy of government to the 
adequacy of its rights-enforcing capacity. If a person’s underlying 
primary rights were threatened or violated, the person’s first step was 
to seek a remedy from the courts. If for some reason, the courts were 
unable to adequately perform this function, the person could petition 
the King or Parliament: 
4. If there should happen any uncommon injury, or 
infringement of the rights beforementioned, which the 
ordinary course of law is too defective to reach, there still 
remains a fourth subordinate right appertaining to every 
individual, namely, the right of petitioning the king, or either 
house of parliament, for the redress of grievances.95 
Petitioning was designed to secure remedies in the rare cases where 
the courts could not. Significantly, Blackstone characterized the right 
to petition in explicitly legal terms, as an extension to Parliament and 
the King of the right to a remedy in the courts. Finally, if petitioning 
itself did not vindicate a person’s primary rights, the person could bear 
arms — to protect himself directly or to rise up against the 
government. This final auxiliary subordinate right is obviously a 
precursor to the Second Amendment and the concept of an armed 
militia as a guarantor of liberty and bulwark against oppression.96 
If we accept a supplicatory reading of the Petition Clause, each of 
these auxiliary subordinate rights is reflected in the federal Constitution 
— except the right to a remedy. 97 Under my remedial theory of the 
 
 93 Id. at *136-39. 
 94 See supra notes 69, 70 and accompanying text. 
 95 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138-39. 
 96 See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104 
YALE L.J. 995, 1009-11 (1995) (reviewing JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR 
ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994)). 
 97 The first two are structural features of the English system that find parallels in 
the law-making power of Congress, U.S. CONST. art. I, and the constitutional 
limitations on executive power. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel 
Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 634-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); Robert J. Reinstein, 
The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259 (2009). The last three rights are 
individual, with the fifth right analogous to the Second Amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend II. 
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Petition Clause, however, all five auxiliary subordinate rights are 
reflected in the federal Constitution, with the First Amendment Petition 
Clause incorporating both the third and the fourth rights. When the 
Framers changed the recipient subclause of the Petition Clause from 
“the Legislature” to “the Government,”98 the rights to two types of 
petitions directed at two different recipients, including the remedial 
expectations attached to them, were merged into one. 
*** 
These historical roots of the petitionary and remedial rights, pre-
dating Magna Carta and traceable forward to Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, demonstrate a co-evolution of two closely linked 
rights, both of which served at least a partially remedial function, but 
each of which was directed at a different institutional actor. Early 
American codifications of these rights mirrored the British practice. 
Prior to the ratification of the First Amendment, colonial charters and 
then state constitutions often contained protections for the right to 
petition the Legislature and a separately enumerated right to a remedy 
from the courts.99 
When the Framers merged the institutional recipient of the Petition 
Clause — changing it from “the Legislature” to “the Government” — 
they encompassed petitions to the judiciary, which were previously 
governed by the English right to a remedy. In so doing, the Framers 
acted against the backdrop of a deep-seated understanding that 
petitions directed toward the courts would, absent adequate 
justification, result in a remedy, and that even petitions directed 
toward the King or Parliament, when legal or appellate in nature, 
would result in remedial action where merited, as well. This historical 
co-evolution provides substantial support for the remedial 
interpretation of the Petition Clause, which placed duties on all 
branches of a now co-equal government in the new American 
Republic. 
B. Text and Drafting History 
With this historical background in mind, I now turn to analyze the 
constitutional text ultimately adopted by the Framers of the First 
 
 98 See infra Part I.B.  
 99 See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 403 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Andrews); Andrews, Right of Access, 
supra note 8, at 604 n.159 (citing constitutional provisions from Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire). 
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Amendment: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right 
of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”100 
As I conduct this analysis, I recognize that one intuitive reading of 
these words — and, indeed, the prevailing interpretation of the text to 
date — is that they guarantee a right that is supplicatory and 
procedural in nature: that the right to petition means only and always 
the right to ask for redress, without any assurance that redress will be 
forthcoming. I call this interpretation the supplicatory interpretation. A 
proponent of the supplicatory interpretation would assert — or 
assume — that the word “petition” is a synonym of “ask,” “beg,” or 
“beseech”; that “petition” entails an entreaty rather than an 
 
 100 U.S. CONST. amend. I. I focus my reading on the heart of the Petition Clause, 
the final nine words that protect the right “to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.” Read as a whole, however, the first eleven words — “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . .” — suggest three additional 
interpretive principles I use in other portions of my analysis. The specification of 
“Congress” as the restrained institution reminds us of the federal orientation of the 
Bill of Rights. See infra Section I.B.6 (suggesting federalism concerns with a stand-
alone right-to-remedy provision). The phrase “shall make no law . . . abridging” 
applies not only to the petitionary right, but to the right of assembly, the freedom of 
speech, and the freedom of the press, suggesting a coherence among all First 
Amendment protections. See infra Part II.A (suggesting the need for a doctrinal 
framework for the remedial right to petition that coheres with other First Amendment 
doctrines). The phrase “the right of the people” suggests an adaptation of pre-existing 
historical rights. See supra Part I.A (looking to the historical development of the 
petitioning practice).  
The First Amendment refers to “the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances,” U.S. CONST. amend. I. For this 
reason, some refer not to two distinct clauses — the Assembly Clause and the Petition 
Clause — but to a unitary “Petition and Assembly Clause,” Jack N. Rakove, The 
Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 113 
(2000), or the “assembly/petition clause,” Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 
WASH. L. REV. 639, 713 (2002). Mazzone has argued that “we should understand 
assembly and petition to belong together,” id. at 712, given the singular “right of the 
people” and the conjunctive “and,” id. at 712-13, and the historical link between 
petitioning and assembly, see id. at 721-29. However, John Inazu has demonstrated 
that this conflation of petition and assembly is unpersuasive as a matter of text and 
drafting history. See John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 
565, 574-77 (2010). The First Amendment “does not limit assembly to the purposes 
of petitioning the government.” Id. at 576. Just as people can assemble without 
petitioning, an individual can petition without assembling, most obviously by 
petitioning a court to redress a legal grievance. The two linguistically distinct clauses 
protect two conceptually distinct rights. The impulse to conflate assembly and 
petitioning into a single right suggests how powerfully the right to petition is 
associated with political petitions addressed to legislatures as opposed to legal 
petitions addressed to courts. 
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entitlement. Such a proponent would further argue that the choice of 
indirect language, guaranteeing a “right to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances” rather than a “right to a redress of grievances,” 
renders it a procedural right to ask for a remedy and not a substantive 
right to get a remedy. 
There is, however, a competing interpretation of the text: that in the 
specific context of legal petitions, these words encompass the 
substantive right of a legally injured person to ask for and obtain 
redress. I call this interpretation the remedial interpretation. In 
elucidating the remedial interpretation, I explain that the word 
“petition” bears two ambiguities — one semantic and one pragmatic 
— that make it supplicatory in some contexts and mandatory in 
others. I then identify four contextual factors that point to a 
mandatory, remedial reading of the word “petition” as it is used in the 
First Amendment: the deliberate and unprecedented broadening of the 
petition recipient from “the Legislature” to “the Government” (thus 
encompassing courts); the specification of “the redress of grievances” 
as the petition goal; the enumeration of a separate Speech Clause that 
already protects supplicatory communications; and the Framers’ 
consideration (and ultimate rejection) of more explicit remedy-
guaranteeing language. 
1. The Ambiguity of “Petition” 
Whether the word “petition” in the Petition Clause has a 
supplicatory or mandatory meaning depends on two linguistic 
ambiguities. First, as a matter of semantics, the word “petition” 
presents a case of polysemy. It is a single term that bears multiple, 
related meanings. One of these meanings is supplicatory (as in “beg”), 
but one is mandatory (as in “claim”). 
Take the various entries for the verb “petition” in the Oxford 
English Dictionary. Some are supplicatory: “[t]o make a request or 
supplication to”; “to ask humbly”; “[t]o solicit, ask, or beg for.”101 
Others connote formality as opposed to supplication: “to address a 
written petition to (an authority) in respect of a particular cause”; “to 
make a formal application to (a court)”; “[t]o address or present a 
petition”; “to file a petition with a court.”102 Note that two of these 
latter four definitions explicitly contemplate a court as the petition’s 
 
 101 Petition, v., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/141859 
(last visited October 20, 2016). 
 102 Id.  
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recipient, and three of them define the verb “petition” in terms of the 
noun “petition.” 
Turn to the entries for the noun “petition” and you will find even 
starker evidence of polysemy. Again, some entries are supplicatory: 
“[a] supplication, entreaty, or prayer”; “[a] solemn and humble prayer 
to God”; “[a] supplicatory clause in a prayer”; “an entreaty, esp. to a 
sovereign or superior.”103 But another entry, focusing specifically on 
petitions to courts, emphasizes formality and redress instead of 
supplication: “[a] formal written application made to a court, setting 
out facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks to some legal 
remedy or relief.”104 Still other entries are themselves subject to 
multiple related interpretations, occupying some intermediate and 
indeterminate point along the supplicatory–obligatory continuum: 
“[t]he action of formally asking, supplicating, or requesting; the action 
of submitting a petition. to make petition: to ask, supplicate, or 
request formally”; “a formal written request or supplication, 
(now) esp. one signed by many people, appealing to an individual or 
group in authority (as a sovereign, legislature, administrative body, 
etc.) for some favour, right, or mercy, or in respect of a particular 
cause.”105 Notably, one entry defines the noun petition as “the thing 
asked or petitioned for” as in “to have (also receive) one’s petition.”106 
The polysemy of “petition” is further revealed by its etymology and 
listed synonyms. The English verb “petition” derives from the Latin 
verb “peto,” a conjugated form of which is used in the very first 
codification of the right to petition in the 1215 Magna Carta.107 In that 
document, the Latin verb is clearly used to refer to a demand rather 
than a request, and the best English interpretation is “to claim” or “to 
demand,” but some scholars of Magna Carta have instead interpreted 
the verb as “to ask.” The synonyms for the verb “petition” listed by the 
Oxford English Dictionary span the entirety of the supplicatory–
obligatory continuum: address; ask; beseech; bid; conjure; crave; 
desire; entreat; implore; imprecate; invoke; mendicate; move; nurn; 
plead; pray; request; require; requisite; seek; solicit; speer; supplicate; 
tell; wish; and yearn. So do the listed synonyms for the noun 
“petition.” 
 
 103 Petition, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/141858 
(last visited January 19, 2017). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 See supra Section I.A.1.  
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Thus, “petition” is a member of a group of conceptually-related 
words that describe an action taken by an individual who is trying to 
obtain something from another individual or institution. This group of 
words is a particularly rich source of polysemy: The effort to obtain 
the goal sought could be characterized alternatively as a request or a 
demand. At one end of the supplicatory–obligatory continuum are 
words such as “beseech” and “pray,”108 which connote a low level of 
enforcement power; at the other end are words such as “command” 
and “require” which clearly place an obligation on the recipient to 
obey. Words such as “petition” and “claim” lie somewhere in the 
middle; they might plausibly signify either a request or a demand. The 
extent to which these words entail an expectation of obtaining what is 
being asked for depends on the context. Take the word “claim.” One 
meaning is akin to an assertion: “The politician claimed that she was 
the best candidate.” Another meaning suggests a right to obtain the 
thing sought: “She claimed her prize.” The meaning varies with 
context. 
The meaning of the word “petition” thus varies depending on the 
context; to petition a court of law signifies something distinct and less 
obviously supplicatory than to petition another individual or 
institution. Sometimes, whether the word “petition” entails an 
entitlement to the petition goal depends on the entity to whom the 
petition is addressed (the petition recipient). When one petitions the 
gods, the word has an obviously and necessarily supplicatory meaning. 
When one petitions a court — an institution bound by the rule of law 
and designed to consider and resolve questions of individual legal 
right — the word often takes on a mandatory significance. 
Moreover, whether the word “petition” entails an entitlement to the 
petition goal also varies depending on the goal sought. Sometimes the 
word “petition” is used in a context in which the agent has a right not 
only to ask the recipient for some goal, but the underlying substantive 
right to obtain the goal if certain criteria are satisfied. Someone who 
“petitions” for a writ of mandamus or for a writ of habeas corpus is 
entitled to that writ if her petition has legal merit.109 Other examples 
 
 108 Note that sometimes even these highly supplicatory words are used non-
literally and function as commands. 
 109 See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.15 (2016) (“The writ of habeas 
corpus shall be granted without delay by the judge or court receiving the petition, 
unless it be manifest . . . that the party is entitled to no relief whatever.”); In re Stake 
Ctr. Locating, Inc., 731 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In reviewing a CVRA 
mandamus petition, we . . . ‘must issue the writ whenever we find that the district 
court’s order reflects an abuse of discretion or legal error.’” (emphasis added) (citing 
Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006))); Weaver v. Foltz, 
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abound.110 By contrast, consider a petition for certiorari lodged in the 
Supreme Court. Because certiorari is discretionary, there is no 
mandatory obligation upon the Court to grant the petition. But note 
that this discretion is suggested by the qualification “for certiorari” 
and does not follow ineluctably from the term “petition” alone; it 
flows from the contextual marker following it. 
Second, as a matter of pragmatics, the connotation of the word 
“petition” may depart from its semantic meaning when used in certain 
cultural contexts. Like many other conceptually-related terms, the 
word “petition,” even when it is unambiguously supplicatory on a 
semantic level, may be used in a context where it is pragmatically 
understood as a demand. 
For example, when a boss says to an employee, “Could I ask you to 
take care of that by the end of the day?” or when a police officer says 
to a motorist, “I’m asking you to please step out of the car,” we 
understand these sentences not as supplicatory requests but as polite 
commands made by individuals in higher positions of authority in a 
manner that de-emphasizes the power inequity between those making 
and those receiving the instruction. The ubiquitous cultural memes “I 
wasn’t asking” and “That wasn’t a question” are necessary and 
commonly arise because of the inherent uncertainty in determining 
whether a particular request is supplicatory or mandatory — 
particularly when higher authorities couch demands as requests. 
Similar pragmatic ambiguities inhere when the individual seeking a 
favorable action is less powerful than the person being asked, due to 
conventions of respect owed to certain authority figures. As discussed 
above,111 as petitioning practice evolved in England over time, and as 
petitions that were once resolved as a matter of grace became 
increasingly routinized and necessitated a resolution as a matter of 
right, it remained of the utmost importance to phrase these demands 
 
888 F.2d 1097, 1099 (6th Cir. 1989) (“A writ of habeas corpus must issue to any 
habeas petitioner whose conviction falls short of this standard.” (emphasis added)). 
 110 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1731b(h) (2012) (“Whenever he finds a violation . . . , the 
Attorney General shall petition [a court] . . . for an [injunction], and upon a [proper] 
showing . . . [an injunction] . . . shall be granted . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. 
§ 5382(a)(1)(A)(v) (2012) (“If the Court does not make a determination within 24 
hours . . . the petition shall be granted by operation of law . . . .”); United States v. 
Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 234 U.S. 476, 490 (1914) (“[T]he right to 
petition the Commission conferred by the statute is positive, and while the refusal to 
grant it may be in one sense negative, in another and broader view it is affirmative, 
since it refuses that which the statute in affirmative terms declares shall be granted if 
only the conditions which the statute provides are found to exist.” (emphasis added)). 
 111 See supra Part I.A.  
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as respectful and humble requests, due to the power dynamics 
between subject and King. This tendency of formally supplicatory 
language to suggest respect — but not absolute discretion — for the 
recipient is particularly relevant in the legal context. Our modern legal 
system retains supplicatory terms of art that are vestiges of historical 
practice developed in earlier political eras defined by royal sovereignty 
and subjecthood112 and that remain meaningful as a cultural attitude 
of respect due to the honorable court. To take but one example, a 
“prayer for relief” is not literally a “prayer” — it is a demand, couched 
in respectful terminology to a judicial authority. Yet it is boilerplate 
language in modern complaints. 
Thus the word “petition” is ambiguous along two dimensions. On a 
semantic level, it is polysemous: the word itself has different meanings 
that vary with context. On a pragmatic level, even if we understand it 
to be supplicatory on a semantic level, it may be used as a respectful 
term of art to soften a formal demand. 
There is, thus, an ambiguity whether the term “petition” takes on a 
supplicatory or mandatory meaning in the Petition Clause. This 
ambiguity casts doubt on the prevailing supplicatory interpretation. In 
the sections below, I explore other contextual features of the Petition 
Clause and its drafting history that, to the contrary, suggest that a 
remedial interpretation is both plausible and more satisfying in the 
context of a meritorious legal petition. 
2. The Recipient and Goal Subclauses 
The verb “petition” contemplates a relationship among three 
concepts113: (1) a petition agent (the petitioner), the subject of the verb, 
the person doing the petitioning; (2) a petition recipient,114 the direct 
object of the verb, the person or entity to whom the petitioner 
addresses her petition; and (3) a petition goal, the indirect object of the 
 
 112 See supra Part I.A.; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“In 
Great Britain the king himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never 
fails to comply with the judgment of his court.”). 
 113 In linguistic terminology, the verb “petition” is trivalent because it expects three 
core arguments, or more specifically ditransitive, because these three core arguments 
are, respectively, a subject, a direct object, and an indirect object. See R.M.W. DIXON, 1 
BASIC LINGUISTIC THEORY 229 (2010); P.H. MATTHEWS, THE CONCISE OXFORD 
DICTIONARY OF LINGUISTICS 415 (2d ed. 2007). 
 114 In linguistic terminology, this thematic role is patient. See generally David 
Dowty, Thematic Proto-Roles and Argument Selection, 67 LANGUAGE 547, 563 (1991) 
(illustrating the traditional thematic roles of agent, patient, and goal). 
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verb, the thing the petitioner seeks from the recipient.115 In the final 
version of the Petition Clause, the petition recipient is identified as 
“the Government” and the petition goal is identified as “a redress of 
grievances.” 
Note that, though the act of petitioning necessarily involves agent, 
recipient, and goal as a conceptual matter, the verb “petition” does not 
require the overt specification of recipient or goal as a linguistic 
matter.116 Each of the following phrases is grammatically sound: 
The right to petition 
The right to petition the Government 
The right to petition for a redress of grievances 
The Framers elected to forgo each of these options and instead 
embrace a phrase that specifies both recipient and goal. Thus, it is 
appropriate to focus carefully on both of these constituent 
components of the Petition Clause. To better understand whether the 
word “petition” is, in context, supplicatory or remedial, I turn next to 
the recipient subclause117 — “the Government”; and the goal 
subclause — “for a redress of grievances.” 
a. “The Government” 
The Petition Clause is one of the few clauses in the Constitution to 
refer to “the Government” as a whole, as opposed to an individual 
institution or actor within it.118 The rarity of the term “Government” 
 
 115 See supra Part I.A. 
 116 In linguistic terminology, the verb “petition” is not strictly ditransitive because 
neither the direct object/patient nor the indirect object/goal are necessary. Contrast 
the verbs “put” or “give.” Both are ditransitive because they require a direct object and 
indirect object in addition to a subject. One can say “he puts the car in the garage,” 
but not “he puts the car,” “he puts in the garage,” or “he puts.”  
 117 I use the term “subclause” not in a technical linguistic sense but only to refer to 
a constituent phrase within a single clause of the constitution.  
 118 Two provisions of the original constitution refer to the District of Columbia as 
“the Seat of the Government of the United States,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; art. II, § 1, as 
does the Twelfth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The Guaranty Clause 
guarantees “to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.” U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, § 4. The Necessary and Proper Clause refers to “all other Powers vested 
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8. Thus, the term “Government” occurs a total of six times in the Unites States 
Constitution — four times in the original constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 14, 
17–18 & art. II, § 1, once in the First Amendment, and once in the Twelfth 
Amendment. The Petition Clause is the only provision in the Bill of Rights to use the 
term “Government,” and the only provision in the entire constitution to refer to the 
“Government” as opposed to the “Government of the United States.”  
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in the Constitution suggests the significance of its use in the recipient 
subclause. 
But if it was rare to use the term “Government” in the Constitution, 
it was unprecedented to use the term “Government” in the recipient 
subclause of a codification of a petitionary right. Its use here suggests 
the expansion of the traditional petitionary right to the judicial 
context. 
The historical record concerning the drafting and ratification of the 
Petition Clause is limited. Historians do, however, know some critical 
information. When James Madison penned the first draft of the 
Petition Clause, his initial version read: “The people shall not be 
restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their 
common good; nor from applying to the legislature by petitions, or 
remonstrances for redress of their grievances.”119 A drafting committee 
then amended the draft language and substituted the term 
“Government” into the recipient subclause.120 This final version was 
approved on July 28, 1789.121 
Unfortunately, no record survives of the debates that led to the 
drafting change. Yet this amendment from “Legislature” to 
“Government” was a novel and therefore significant innovation. When 
the Founders drafted the First Amendment, seven state constitutions 
codified a right to petition, and all used the term “Legislature” in the 
recipient subclause.122 And in virtually all prior British and colonial 
codifications of a petitionary right, the recipient was identified as 
“King” and/or “parliament.”123 
 
 119 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS 12 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) (emphasis added). 
 120 See id. at 30; see also Pfander, supra note 8, at 958-59 (discussing the drafting 
history). 
 121 See Pfander, supra note 8, at 957. 
 122 See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 403 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Andrews); Andrews, Right of Access, 
supra note 8, at 604 n.159 (citing constitutional provisions from Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire).  
 123 See, e.g., Bill of Rights 1688, 1 W. & M. c. 2 (Eng. & Wales) (“That it is the 
right of the subjects to petition the King . . . .”); STAMP ACT CONGRESS, DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS AND GRIEVANCES art. 13 (1765), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 195, 198 (1971) (stating “[t]hat it is the right of the 
British subjects in these colonies to petition the King or either House of Parliament”); 
1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 70 (Worthington Chauncey 
Ford ed. 1904) (Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, stating 
the “right peaceably to assemble, consider of their grievances, and petition the 
King . . . .”); MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61 (Eng. 1215). Although it did not use the term 
“Government,” the colonial Massachusetts Body of Liberties was an outlier in 
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The conscious decision of the Framers to depart from virtually all 
historical and contemporaneous codifications of the petitionary right 
and to explicitly amend the draft text to expand the petitionary 
recipient from “Legislature” to “Government” strongly suggests that 
the scope of the Petition Clause was expanded with the textual 
change.124 The new language encompasses petitions made to all three 
branches of government. It therefore covers not only petitions to the 
legislative or executive branches, but also legal petitions by legally 
injured persons seeking individualized relief from the courts. By 
expanding the petitionary right to the judiciary, the Framers 
incorporated into the Petition Clause the traditional understanding 
that meritorious legal claims filed in court triggered an entitlement to 
redress. 
b. “For a redress of grievances” 
The remedial theory of the Petition Clause receives further support 
from the goal subclause — “for a redress of grievances.”125 Note that 
the terms “redress” and “grievances” appear only in the Petition 
Clause and nowhere else within the original Constitution or Bill of 
Rights.126 And, as previously stated, this subclause is grammatically 
unnecessary, suggesting that its inclusion in the text is deliberate and 
significant.127 
The goal subclause informs both the purpose and the scope of the 
petitionary right, and speaks explicitly in terms of remediation. The 
Court’s consideration of the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause in 
defining that Amendment’s purpose and scope provides a useful 
analogy. In the Second Amendment, the operative clause is preceded 
by a prefatory clause which “announces [the] purpose” of the 
Amendment, and the Court has recognized that this specification of 
purpose informs the Amendment’s meaning: “Logic demands that 
 
guaranteeing the right to petition any “publique Court, Councel, or Towne meeting.” 
MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES cl. 12 (1641), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 69, 72 (1971).  
 124 Other scholars agree. See Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8, at 615-16; 
Pfander, supra note 8, at 957. 
 125 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 126 These terms do appear in another Founding document, THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776), which enumerated a list of grievances, see id. paras. 3–28, 
and then stated: “[W]e have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms. Our 
repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury,” id. ¶ 29. The 
Founders clearly expected, and were aggrieved by the absence of, a remedy for their 
petitions to England. See supra note 53. 
 127 See supra text accompanying notes 111–12.  
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there be a link between the stated purpose and the command. . . . That 
requirement of logical connection may cause a prefatory clause to 
resolve an ambiguity in the operative clause.”128 
The Petition Clause is distinct from the Second Amendment in that 
it is not separated into prefatory and operative clauses. But the Petition 
Clause is similar in that it contains additional language — the goal 
subclause — that specifies the purpose of a “petition” and hence of the 
petitioning right guaranteed by its operative language. “Logic 
demands . . . a link between the stated purpose and the command,” 
and that “requirement of logical connection may cause” the purpose-
specifying language “to resolve an ambiguity” in the operative 
language.129 
By expanding the recipient subclause to “the Government,” the 
Framers extended the right to petition to the judicial forum, where the 
goal subclause takes on specialized meaning in light of the distinctive 
democratic function of legal petitions. When an individual petitions a 
court, the grievance she asserts is legal injury, and the redress she 
seeks is individualized rights-vindication. In this context, the goal 
subclause “for a redress of grievances” connotes the purpose of 
ensuring individualized redress, rather than participatory interests, 
and logic demands a link between this purpose and the scope of the 
command. Thus, the right to petition the courts logically entails a 
right to a remedy. 
In sum, the remedial interpretation accounts for and draws support 
from the precise words the Framers selected — the right “to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.” 
3. The Presumption Against Superfluity 
The remedial interpretation offers the best account for how the 
Petition Clause bears a distinct meaning from the separately-
enumerated Speech Clause. Proponents of the supplicatory 
interpretation, by contrast, struggle to distinguish between the two 
guarantees, for purely supplicatory communications fall squarely 
within the protections of the Speech Clause, thus rendering the 
Petition Clause mere surplusage. 
Start with a fundamental principle of constitutional interpretation 
— the presumption against superfluity: 
 
 128 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008). 
 129 Id. 
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All constitutional provisions have equal dignity, and each 
subsection, sentence, and clause of a constitution must be read 
in light of the others to form a congruous whole so as not to 
render any language superfluous. The presumption and legal 
intendment is that every clause in a written constitution has 
been inserted for some useful purpose, and courts should 
avoid a construction which would render any portion of the 
constitution meaningless, idle, inoperative, needless, or 
nugatory.130 
Now consider the First Amendment as a whole. The First 
Amendment separately enumerates “the freedom of speech” and “the 
right . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”131 If 
the right to petition is merely the right to ask, how can it be 
distinguished from the already-enumerated freedom of speech? A 
petition to the government generally involves written and oral 
communication and necessarily entails expressive conduct already 
protected by the Speech Clause, because by definition a petition is 
intended to express a grievance.132 Thus, the Supreme Court has 
 
 130 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 99 (2016). The Court has repeatedly affirmed this 
principle. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 759 
(1978); Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 407 (1920) (Clarke, J., dissenting); 
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 87 (1900); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 
174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to 
be without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words 
require it.”). This principle of constitutional interpretation goes by different names: 
alternatively styled a principle, rule, or canon against or anti superfluity, superfluities, 
surplusage or superfluousness. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Klukowski, Severability Doctrine: 
How Much of a Statute Should Federal Courts Invalidate?, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 13 
n.44 (2011) (citing cases using alternative formulations).  
 131 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 132 For example, when a person files a lawsuit, both the words written on the 
physical piece of paper (the complaint), and the expressive act of filing it at the clerk’s 
office, are already protected by the Speech Clause. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 4 (2010) (“Even if the material-support statute generally 
functions as a regulation of conduct, as applied to plaintiffs the conduct triggering 
coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message.”); Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“A law directed at the communicative nature of conduct 
must, like a law directed at speech itself, be justified by the substantial showing of 
need that the First Amendment requires.” (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence 
v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). The Court in 
Guarnieri almost, but not quite, recognized that petitioning entails expressive conduct 
protected by the Speech Clause. “Petitions are a form of expression, and employees 
who invoke the Petition Clause in most cases could invoke as well the Speech Clause 
of the First Amendment.” Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 382 (2011). 
It is not clear why the Court said “most cases” instead of “all cases.” Since petitioning 
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recognized that a citizen who writes a letter to the President critical of 
a public official or a government employee who files a grievance or 
lawsuit against his employer enjoys protection under both the Petition 
Clause and the Speech Clause.133 But if the Petition Clause provides no 
greater protection, it has no practical effect independent of the Speech 
Clause. 
The presumption against superfluity is neither absolute nor 
determinative. But it is relevant here, in a way that supports the 
remedial interpretation over the supplicatory interpretation. Some 
have critiqued the presumption on the ground that communication 
frequently involves repetition and drafters may add language for 
emphasis.134 But despite this criticism, the presumption remains an 
accepted tool of constitutional interpretation.135 And while 
communication may involve repetition and emphasis, this is a 
particularly egregious violation of the anti-superfluity principle: 
eviscerating an entire nine-word Clause of a constitutional 
amendment that the Founders modified shortly before passage.136 
This superfluity problem has not gone unnoticed. Initially, the 
Court ignored it, emphasizing the unity of the First Amendment.137 In 
 
by definition constitutes a subset of expressive activity, it is difficult to imagine 
conduct that would be protected by the Petition Clause but not the Speech Clause.  
 133 Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 387 (“Guarnieri just as easily could have alleged that his 
employer retaliated against him for the speech contained within his grievances and 
lawsuit.”); McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 489 (1985) (“A citizen who criticizes a 
public official is shielded by the Speech and Press Clauses . . . .” (Brennan, J., 
concurring)).  
 134 Loving v. Internal Revenue Serv., 742 F.3d 1013, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(“[L]awmakers, like Shakespeare characters, sometimes employ overlap or 
redundancy so as to remove any doubt and make doubly sure.”); see also Abbe R. 
Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside — an Empirical 
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
901, 934-35 (2013).  
 135 Furthermore, the surplusage in Loving was a provision of a tax statute, not a 
Clause in the Bill of Rights. Loving, 742 F.3d at 1014-19. 
 136 Finally, one can argue that the Petition Clause is superfluous only because the 
Speech Clause has been expanded beyond its original intended meaning. Perhaps the 
original intention was for the Speech Clause to cover certain oral communications, the 
Press Clause to cover certain written communications, and the Petition Clause to 
cover certain formal communications. But the more relevant question for present-day 
jurists and scholars is how best to address the superfluity problem within the context 
of modern First Amendment jurisprudence. Even if the superfluity problem has arisen 
in such stark terms because of the Court’s expanding speech doctrine, the superfluity 
problem remains.  
 137 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 
353, 364 (1937); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).  
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the 1985 case of McDonald v. Smith,138 the Court rejected greater 
Petition Clause protection from defamation liability, refusing to 
“elevate the Petition Clause to special First Amendment status.”139 
McDonald sparked scholarly criticism emphasizing the superfluity 
problem inherent in the Court’s refusal to distinguish petitioning from 
speech.140 In the 2011 case of Borough of Duryea — the Court’s most 
recent Petition Clause case — the majority once again rejected greater 
Petition Clause protection, this time in the context of government 
employer retaliation. Justice Scalia, with characteristically caustic wit, 
excoriated the majority’s failure to resolve the superfluity problem: 
“The complexity of treating the Petition Clause and Speech Clause 
separately is attributable to the inconsiderate disregard for judicial 
convenience displayed by those who ratified a First Amendment that 
included both provisions as separate constitutional rights.141 
Acknowledging this critique, the Guarnieri majority clarified that 
McDonald should not be “interpreted to mean that the right to petition 
can extend no further than the right to speak,”142 and suggested that 
the superfluity problem may be addressed in a future case. 
Courts should not presume there is always an essential 
equivalence in the two Clauses or that Speech Clause 
precedents necessarily and in every case resolve Petition 
Clause claims. . . . There may arise cases where the special 
concerns of the Petition Clause would provide a sound basis 
for a distinct analysis; and if that is so, the rules and principles 
that define the two rights might differ in emphasis and 
formulation.143 
 
 138 472 U.S. 479. 
 139 Id. at 485. 
 140 See, e.g., Mark, supra note 8, at 2154-56 (discussing how the Supreme Court has 
merged the Petition Clause into other constitutionally protected speech); Eric 
Schnapper, ‘Libelous’ Petitions for Redress of Grievances — Bad Historiography Makes 
Worse Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 303, 305-312 (1989) (analyzing the various reasons the 
Supreme Court has given for not providing petitioning with greater protections than 
other protected speech); Smith, supra note 13, at 1188 (criticizing the McDonald court 
for making careless assumptions concerning the framer’s intentions and whether the 
right to petition can be provided greater constitutional protections than other forms of 
speech); Spanbauer, supra note 8, at 52 (arguing that the Supreme Court ignored both 
the drafter’s intent and the history of petitioning when refusing to grant it greater 
protection than that afforded to other protected speech).  
 141 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 405 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 142 Id. at 389 (majority opinion). 
 143 Id. at 388-89. 
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Petition Clause scholars have tried, thus far unsuccessfully, to 
resolve the superfluity problem. Some have argued that all petitions — 
political and legal — enjoy more extensive immunity from 
punishment than ordinary speech, in light of the distinctive history of 
petitioning practice.144 Others have suggested that all petitions — 
political and legal — trigger a governmental duty to respond, again 
based on historical petitioning practice.145 These prior theories 
distinguish petitioning from speech without distinguishing among 
petitions. Thus, they call for greater constitutional protection for all 
petitions — whether legal or political, meritorious or otherwise. The 
Court has not embraced these theories. The Court has twice rejected 
greater petitioning immunity, first in the case of defamation liability 
for a political petition, and then in the case of government employer 
retaliation for a legal petition.146 The Court has also twice rejected a 
duty to respond in cases involving political petitions,147 and scholars 
have acknowledged its practical infeasibility.148 
The remedial interpretation of the Petition Clause offers a new 
solution to the superfluity problem: petitioning is different from 
speech because lawsuits are not just petitions, but distinctive petitions 
that enjoy special First Amendment protection.149 Unlike prior efforts, 
this approach is consistent with Supreme Court precedent and better 
 
 144 See Schnapper, supra note 140, at 345; Smith, supra note 13, at 1188; 
Spanbauer, supra note 8, at 52. 
 145 See Higginson, supra note 14, at 142-43, 155; Hodgkiss, supra note 8, at 572-73. 
 146 Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 389; McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985).  
 147 Minn. Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984); Smith v. Ark. 
State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979). But c.f. Guarnieri, 564 
U.S. at 390 (“Unlike speech of other sorts, a lawsuit demands a response.”). 
 148 See Higginson, supra note 14, at 166; Mark, supra note 8, at 2214-15. 
Interestingly, the Obama Administration launched an online petitioning platform, but 
it only aimed to respond to the small subset of petitions that receive 100,000 
signatures. See Petition the White House on Issues That Matter to You, WHITE HOUSE, 
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/responses (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
 149 James Pfander argues that the First Amendment right to petition includes a 
right to “pursue judicial remedies for government misconduct.” Pfander, supra note 8, 
at 906. My theory draws on and resonates with Pfander’s, but there are several key 
differences. My claims about the relationship between the right to petition, the 
Eleventh Amendment, and sovereign immunity are more modest than Pfander’s. 
Compare supra note 18, with Pfander, supra note 8, at 899 & n.3. On the other hand, 
my theory is broader than Pfander’s because, while I recognize the governmental 
status of the defendant as a factor triggering heightened scrutiny, see infra notes 257–
59 & accompanying text, I claim a right to a remedy for any legal injury, whether 
caused by governmental or private misconduct. 
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coheres with the historical, textual, and functional distinctiveness of 
the Petition Clause.150 
4. The Proposed and Rejected Right to a Remedy Provision 
Proponents of the supplicatory interpretation may ask why the 
Framers were not even clearer by codifying explicit right-to-a-remedy 
language, either in the Petition Clause itself or in a separate 
constitutional provision. In this section, I argue that more explicit 
language within the Petition Clause would have been problematic. I 
then explain that the Founders considered, but ultimately rejected, a 
stand-alone, enumerated right to a remedy. The rejection, as explained 
below, is best understood as a recognition that adopting the proposed 
right-to-a-remedy provision would have raised substantial federalism 
concerns, and that the right to remedy was already encompassed by 
the right to petition. 
First, there is a simple answer to the question why the Framers 
declined to replace the Petition Clause with the words “a right to a 
remedy.” That hypothetical amendment cannot accommodate 
differential treatment of petitions based on whether they are political 
or legal, meritorious or frivolous.151 
 
 150 The remedial interpretation also enjoys some support from the Guarnieri 
Court’s discussion of the relationship between petitioning and speech, and between 
the Petition Clause and the Speech Clause. The Court emphasized that 
“[i]nterpretation of the Petition Clause must be guided by the objectives and 
aspirations that underlie the right.” Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 388. The Court 
distinguished petitioning from speech on the ground that “[a] petition conveys the 
special concerns of its author to the government and, in its usual form, requests action 
by the government to address those concerns.” Id. at 388-89. And the Court 
distinguished legal petitioning from speech on the ground that “[u]nlike speech of 
other sorts, a lawsuit demands a response.” Id. at 390. The Court was likely referring 
to the duty of the governmental defendant, rather than the court, to respond to the 
lawsuit — but the two duties are related. If the court simply ignores a lawsuit, there is 
no need for the defendant to respond.  
 151 The Framers could have codified: “A right to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances, and in the case of meritorious legal grievances, the right to redress.” 
I concede that this formulation achieves greater clarity and precision. Indeed, any 
constitutional provision could be clearer with additional language, but the absence of 
such language cannot determine the scope of the constitutional right without absurd 
consequences. Moreover, this formulation would be unnecessary if the right to a legal 
petition was already understood to include the right of a legally injured person to 
obtain a meaningful remedy. This is precisely the understanding that the Framers 
would have had, as was discussed in more depth in Part I.A above. Finally, any 
explicit codification of a right to a remedy either within the Petition Clause or in a 
separate provision triggers federalism concerns, discussed below. 
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However, even if the Framers for this reason chose to preserve the 
language of the Petition Clause as we see it today, why didn’t they also 
include a separately enumerated constitutional right to a remedy? As 
discussed above,152 a stand-alone right-to-a-remedy provision was 
codified in Magna Carta,153 in Sir Edward Coke’s Institutes,154 in 
Blackstone’s Commentaries,155 and in five state constitutions extant at 
the time of the Founding.156 And today, a stand-alone right-to-a-
remedy provision is contained in forty state constitutions.157 
In fact, three of the states that ratified the original Constitution 
formally proposed a stand-alone right-to-a-remedy provision for 
inclusion in the Bill of Rights.158 James Madison declined to include 
this proposal in his draft, but the Senate on its own initiative proposed 
and considered a stand-alone right-to-a-remedy provision.159 The 
Senate ultimately rejected the proposal, and unfortunately, we have no 
historical record of the Senate debate preceding that vote.160 But there 
is good reason to interpret these drafting choices as consistent with — 
indeed supportive of — the remedial interpretation of the Petition 
Clause. 
To begin, the proposal of a stand-alone right-to-a-remedy provision 
by three states and the Senate demonstrates the importance of a 
remedial right to many participants in the Framing process. Its 
ultimate failure, however, does not necessarily entail a rejection of the 
concept of a remedial right. Bear in mind that a specific separation-of-
powers provision was also proposed and ultimately defeated during 
the Framing process.161 Neither scholars nor jurists infer from this fact 
that the principle of separation-of-powers was thus rejected by the 
 
 152 See supra Part I.A. 
 153 MAGNA CARTA, ch. 40 (Eng. 1215). 
 154 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
*45, 55 (1642). 
 155 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *137. 
 156 Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8, at 607 & n.166 (citing right-to-remedy 
provisions in Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New 
Hampshire). 
 157 Phillips, supra note 3, at 1310 & n.6. 
 158 See Koch, supra note 4, at 372. 
 159 Id. at 374-75. 
 160 Id. (“On September 8, 1789, the Senate considered and rejected an amendment, 
based on one of Virginia’s proposed amendments, that would have specifically 
guaranteed an individual’s right to a judicial remedy ‘for all injuries or wrongs he may 
receive in his person, property, or character.’ Available records provide no insight into 
the reasons for the rejection of this provision.”). 
 161 See Pfander, supra note 8, at 959 & n.219. 
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Framers. Instead, the rejection of the specific separation-of-powers 
provision proposed is generally understood to reflect one or both of 
two things: (1) the provision was deemed superfluous because 
separation of powers was already established by other constitutional 
provisions;162 and/or (2) there were objections to the specific language 
of the provision.163 
An analogous analysis makes eminent sense when it comes to a 
remedial right and the ultimate defeat of the proposed stand-alone 
right-to-a-remedy provision. This provision was not defeated because 
the Framers rejected the right, but because the right was already 
embedded in the Petition Clause.164 
This reading of original intent is substantially strengthened when we 
recognize a serious drawback to the rejected provision: the potential 
aggrandizement of federal jurisdiction. This danger is evident from the 
sheer breadth of the proposed language for a constitutional right to a 
remedy. Virginia’s proposal, which was identical to North Carolina’s 
proposal and similar to Rhode Island’s version, read as follows: 
That every freeman ought to find a certain remedy, by 
recourse to the laws, for all injuries and wrongs he may receive 
in his person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right 
and justice freely, without sale, completely and without denial, 
promptly and without delay, and that all establishments or 
 
 162 See, e.g., Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8, at 619 (positing that the Senate 
may have agreed with House Representative Sherman’s argument that a separation of 
powers provision was unnecessary because the Constitution already provided for 
separation of powers); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Shot (Not) Heard ‘Round the 
World: Reconsidering the Perplexing U.S. Preoccupation with the Separation of Legislative 
and Executive Powers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2010) (hypothesizing that the Senate 
may have felt that the constitutionally mandated separation of powers were sufficient 
and wanted to maintain some malleability going forward when rejecting the 
separation of powers provision); Dennis G. LaGory, Federalism, Separation of Powers, 
and Individual Liberties, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1361 (1987) (arguing that Congress 
rejected a specific constitutional provision in favor of creating a government with a 
structure incapable of concentrating too much power in the hands of any one branch). 
 163 See, e.g., Bernard Schwartz, Curiouser and Curiouser: The Supreme Court’s 
Separation of Powers Wonderland, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587, 590 (1990) (arguing 
that the reason why the separation of powers provision did not pass was that the 
version of the bill the Senate voted on was heavily revised from Madison’s version and 
used objectionable language).  
 164 Note that the Senate considered and rejected the right-to-a-remedy provision on 
September 8, 1789. Koch, supra note 4, at 374-75. This was only six weeks after the 
Petition Clause was finalized on July 28, 1789. See Pfander, supra note 8, at 957. 
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regulations contravening these rights are oppressive and 
unjust.165 
This proposed language has the virtue of containing the direct and 
mandatory language sought by the proponent of the supplicatory 
interpretation: The rights to “find a certain remedy . . . for all injuries 
and wrongs” and to “obtain right and justice freely . . . completely . . . 
[and] promptly” are substantive rights to obtain redress, not mere 
procedural rights to ask for redress. Contravention of these rights is 
prohibited as “oppressive and unjust.” This language explicitly 
provides for a remedy in the case of a meritorious legal petition that 
establishes “injuries” through “recourse to the laws.” 
But this proposed language also has a fatal defect. A remedial right 
logically entails a correlative remedial duty on the part of the 
government, and a remedial duty logically entails remedial power. But 
the overriding objective of the Bill of Rights, as indicated by the very 
first word of the First Amendment, was to constrain — not to 
aggrandize — federal power.166 The Framers understood rights 
enforcement and remedy provision as the primary realm of state 
courts. They drafted Article III carefully to circumscribe the 
jurisdiction of federal courts.167 These federalism concerns were at the 
forefront at the Founding, but they were entirely absent in the prior 
political contexts from which this proposed right-to-a-remedy 
provision was adapted. Thus, the proposed provision was vulnerable 
to the objection that it would explode the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts, usurp the traditional role of the states, and dramatically alter 
the federal–state balance.168 
 
 165 Koch, supra note 4, at 372 (citations omitted). 
 166 See, e.g., Amar, The Bill of Rights, supra note 9, at 1142 (arguing that proposed 
amendments concerning the size of government during framing period were aimed at 
limiting federal power). 
 167 See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and Constitutional 
Socio-Economic Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 923, 
971-72 (2011) (describing how Article III was drafted to limit the ability of federal 
courts to adjudicate matters through standing requirements and often times leaving 
the power to issue remedies with state courts). 
 168 Linde, supra note 4, at 138 n.38 (“But it would have made no sense to ‘limit’ 
this [federal] government by a demand that it afford every man ‘remedy in due course 
of law for injury done him in his person, property or reputation’ — matters of 
common law that were not among the powers delegated to Congress.”); see also Erie 
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no federal general common 
law . . . . And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the 
federal courts.”). 
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The federalism objection renders the proposed amendment 
problematic. And the Petition Clause renders the proposed 
amendment unnecessary if it was already understood to codify a 
limited remedial right — and impose a correlative remedial duty — 
applicable when petitions were properly brought before the federal 
judiciary. If the design problem was to codify a remedial right without 
generating federalism concerns, the most elegant solution was to 
simply expand the petition recipient in the Petition Clause from “the 
Legislature” to “the Government.” Which, of course, is precisely what 
the Framers did. 
C. Precedent 
The remedial interpretation of the Petition Clause enjoys significant 
support from Supreme Court precedent, including both early, 
Founding-era opinions, and decades of modern Petition Clause 
jurisprudence. Chisholm and Marbury provide strong evidence that the 
Founding generation understood the right to petition the Government 
to include the right of legally injured persons to obtain meaningful 
remedies. In the second half of the Twentieth Century, the Court 
began to more explicitly frame remedial rights in terms of the right to 
petition. 
1. Early Recognition of the First Amendment Right to a Remedy 
The earliest cases of the Court provide strong support for the 
remedial theory. Two years after the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 
1791, the Supreme Court decided Chisholm v. Georgia,169 a dispute 
between an individual seeking judicial redress for legal injury and a 
state invoking sovereign immunity from federal court jurisdiction. The 
English legal system had managed this clash between sovereign 
immunity and an individual’s right to a remedy through centuries of 
intricate petitioning practice. Chisholm gave the Court its first 
opportunity to consider how to resolve these conflicting principles in 
the new American constitutional system. In a 4–1 decision, with five 
seriatim opinions, the Court came down decisively on the side of 
individual remedial rights, declaring that Article III gave federal courts 
jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit filed by a British subject against an 
unconsenting state.170 Although the Court’s holding focused on the 
 
 169 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, 
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 170 See id. at 466-67, 469 (opinion of Cushing, J.). 
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jurisdictional provisions of Article III, the case logically implicated the 
question of whether an individual could petition the federal judiciary 
for legal redress of unlawful state conduct.171 This may be why 
Attorney General Randolph, arguing for Chisholm on behalf of the 
United States, insisted that the jurisdictional dispute “brings into 
question a constitutional right.”172 
Justice Iredell, the sole dissenter, based his opinion on a detailed 
examination of English petitionary practice to the King, which he 
characterized as supplicatory.173 His colleagues had two responses. 
First, they disputed his characterization of English petitionary 
practice, which they deemed supplicatory in form but mandatory in 
substance.174 Second, they disputed the legal significance of English 
petitionary practice to the new American constitutional order.175 The 
Founders had struck a new balance between governmental power and 
individual rights, substituting popular sovereignty for royal 
sovereignty.176 In this new order, “there are citizens, but no subjects,” 
and even a state must “answer the fair demands of its creditor” 
according to “general principles of right.”177 
 
 171 See id. at 466.  
 172 Id. at 420 (oral argument). I have been unable to identify an authoritative 
explanation of precisely which “constitutional right” Randolph referred to during oral 
argument. The underlying right Chisholm was seeking to enforce was contractual, not 
constitutional. It is possible that Randolph conceived of the right in constitutional 
terms in light of the Contracts Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 cl. 1. It is also possible 
that Randolph was thinking of Article III as a “constitutional right,” but this seems an 
unusual formulation for a structural provision, and in any event, if Article III codifies 
a right of court access, that right is incorporated by the First Amendment because the 
recipient subclause contains Article III courts as a branch of “the Government.” The 
frequent discussion of English petitioning practice in the Chisholm opinions, see infra 
notes 222, 224 and accompanying text, suggests that a better view is that the 
“constitutional right” spoken of is the right to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 173 See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 437-45 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 174 See, e.g., id. at 460 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (“True it is, that now in England the 
King must be sued in his Courts by petition, but even now, the difference is only in 
the form, not in the thing.”). 
 175 See, e.g., id. at 466 (opinion of Cushing, J.) (“The point turns not upon the law 
or practice of England . . . but upon the Constitution established by the people of the 
United States[.]”); id. at 452 (opinion of Blair, J.) (arguing that the English petition of 
right “may have been established as the most respectful form of demand; but we are 
not now in a State-Court[.] . . . [A] State, by adopting the Constitution, has agreed to 
be amenable to the judicial power of the United States . . . [and] has, in that respect, 
given up her right of sovereignty.”). 
 176 See id. at 454, 458 (opinion of Wilson, J.).  
 177 Id. at 456.  
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Chisholm thus supports a remedial theory of the right to petition. 
Just two years after the ratification of the Bill of Rights, confronted 
with a “question [of] constitutional right,”178 the Chisholm Court 
decisively rejected a proffered limit on an individual’s right to judicial 
redress for legal injury. 
Though the Eleventh Amendment overruled Chisholm’s specific 
holding, limiting federal court jurisdiction in suits against the states,179 
the Court similarly linked petitionary practice and remedial rights a 
decade after Chisholm, in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.180 
Writing for a unanimous court, and citing Blackstone, Chief Justice 
John Marshall emphasized the individual’s right to obtain — and the 
courts’ corresponding duty to provide — meaningful judicial redress 
for a meritorious legal grievance. Marshall declared it “a settled and 
invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a 
remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”181 
Marshall made precisely the same functional distinction between 
political and legal grievances and accountability that underlies the 
remedial interpretation of the Petition Clause. On matters of 
discretionary policy, the President “is accountable only to his country 
in his political character . . . .”182 But when it comes to individual legal 
rights, he “who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the 
laws of his country for a remedy.”183 As noted above in Part II.A, 
Marshall linked this remedial right to the right to petition, specifically 
invoking English petitioning practice and emphasizing its mandatory 
and remedial character. “In Great Britain the king himself is sued in 
the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply with the 
judgment of his court.”184 Marshall also linked this remedial guarantee 
to a form of individual democratic accountability fundamental to the 
American constitutional order. He characterized “the right of every 
[injured] individual to claim the protection of the laws” as “[t]he very 
essence of civil liberty” and affording such protection among “the first 
duties of government.”185 “[I]f the laws furnish no remedy for the 
violation of a vested legal right,” Marshall warned, the United States 
 
 178 Id. at 420 (oral argument). 
 179 See supra note 18 for a discussion of the relationship between the Eleventh 
Amendment and the Petition Clause.  
 180 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 181 Id. at 147 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *109). 
 182 Id. at 165-66. 
 183 Id. at 166. 
 184 Id. at 163. 
 185 Id. 
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government “will certainly cease to deserve [the] high appellation” of 
being “emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.”186 
Marshall ultimately concluded that the federal court could not 
provide a remedy in this particular case because of Article III limits on 
federal court jurisdiction.187 This case-specific remedy denial is 
consistent with the theory that the First Amendment includes a 
meaningful, but non-absolute, right to a remedy, and the tiered 
scrutiny doctrinal framework proposed infra, which presumes that 
burdens on the remedial right may be permissible if justified by a 
sufficiently compelling governmental interest. Constitutional limits on 
federal court jurisdiction, articulated in Article III and the Eleventh 
Amendment, necessarily entail a judgment that the structural interests 
they serve justify the remedial burden they impose. But while Marbury 
does not stand for an absolute remedial right, it does provide powerful 
support for a limited but meaningful First Amendment right to a 
remedy — the “right [of an individual] to resort to the laws of his 
country for a remedy”188 through “the respectful form of a petition”189 
— for a redress of a legal grievance — the “proper redress” for a legal 
injury.190 
Twenty years after Marbury, Justice Bushrod Washington, sitting as 
circuit justice, listed among the privileges and immunities of national 
citizenship protected by Article IV, Section 2 the right to “institute and 
maintain actions of any kind” in state courts.191 And in 1838, the 
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of remedial access to the 
courts without the same type of link to petitioning practice evidenced 
in Chisholm and Marbury.192 The Court repeatedly reaffirmed the 
characterization of the court access right as a privilege and immunity 
of national citizenship in four cases between 1870 and 1907.193 During 
 
 186 Id. 
 187 See id. at 176, 180 (“The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the 
act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to 
public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution . . . . [A] law 
repugnant to the constitution is void; and . . . courts, as well as other departments, are 
bound by that instrument.”). 
 188 Id. at 166. 
 189 Id. at 163. 
 190 Id. at 147. 
 191 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).  
 192 See Kendall v. U.S. ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 624 (1838) (It would be 
a ”monstrous absurdity in a well organized government, that there should be no 
remedy, although a clear and undeniable right should be shown to exist”). 
 193 See Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) (“The right to 
sue and defend in the courts . . . is one of the highest and most essential privileges of 
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this time, and going forward, the Court also began to analyze remedial 
rights and remedy denials in terms of Due Process and Equal 
Protection.194 As the Court shifted its focus to other textual bases of 
remedial rights, it also began to ignore the legal, rights-enforcing half 
of the dual Petition Clause, recasting the right to petition as a purely 
political right directed exclusively to Congress.195 In this way, the First 
Amendment right to a remedy, after its early recognition in Chisholm 
and Marbury, entered a period of neglect and erasure, lying dormant 
in Supreme Court jurisprudence, waiting to be rediscovered in 
modern times. 
2. Modern Rediscovery of the First Amendment Right to a Remedy 
Neither the Court’s most recent Petition Clause case196 nor Petition 
Clause scholarship has recognized the extent to which modern 
Petition Clause precedent supports the remedial theory. This failure of 
recognition is revealed vividly by the attack Justice Scalia penned in 
Guarnieri,197 which misunderstood even the scope of precedential 
support for the more basic principle that lawsuits are petitions. Yet a 
full and fair reading of all the relevant precedent provides substantial 
 
citizenship . . . .”); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 252 (1898) (noting that previous 
decisions, which held that the right to maintain actions was an essential privilege 
guaranteed by the Constitution, had not been modified or overruled); Cole v. 
Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 113-14 (1890) (“The intention of section 2, art. 4, was to 
confer on the citizens of the several states a general citizenship, and to communicate 
all the privileges and immunities which the citizens of the same state would be 
entitled to under the like circumstances; and this includes the right to institute 
actions.”); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870) (“[T]he [privileges 
and immunities] clause plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a 
citizen of one State to . . . maintain actions in the courts of the State . . . .”).  
 194 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 6, at 568-80 (citing multiple cases analyzing the 
remedial access right through a due process lens between 1875 and 1976). For other 
recent equal protection cases, see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Smith v. 
Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
 195 See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) (“Thus, [included] 
among the rights and privileges of national citizenship recognized by this court 
[is] . . . the right to petition Congress for a redress of grievances . . . .”); In re Quarles, 
158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895) (suggesting that the authority to protect rights conferred by 
the Constitution is reserved exclusively to Congress); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 
U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (“[The First Amendment] was not intended to limit the powers 
of the State governments in respect to their own citizens, but to operate upon the 
National government alone.”). 
 196 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379 (2011). This is the most recent 
Supreme Court Petition Clause case at the time of publication.  
 197 See supra note 12. 
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support for the premise that lawsuits are petitions that trigger special 
First Amendment protection in the form of a remedial right. 
The most commonly recognized precedential support for the claim 
that lawsuits are petitions is a line of cases — what I call the economic 
litigation line — which limited the application of federal antitrust and 
labor laws when businesses petition courts by suing competitors or 
employees — a petitioning immunity.198 Yet the remedial thrust of 
these cases is often overlooked, partly because they involved 
interpretation of federal statutes, and partly because the alleged 
Petition Clause infringements mostly consisted of retaliation — in the 
form of antitrust or labor law liability — imposed for litigation 
activity. 
Consider Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB,199 in which the 
Court invoked the Petition Clause in limiting the NLRB’s ability to 
enjoin a state lawsuit as an unfair labor practice under the NLRA 
absent a determination that the suit was baseless and motivated by 
retaliatory intent.200 The Court explicitly framed the NLRB’s prior 
restraint as an absolute remedy denial, emphasizing that enjoining a 
meritorious lawsuit “totally deprive[s] [the employer] of a remedy for 
an actual injury,”201 stripping the employer of “local judicial 
protection from tortious conduct.”202 The Court, moreover, explained 
that “knowingly frivolous” claims do not advance “[t]he first 
amendment interests involved in private litigation,” which the court 
identified as “public airing of disputed facts,” “the psychological 
benefits of vindication,” and “compensation for violated rights.”203 In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Brennan recognized a constitutional “right 
to file and to prosecute a lawsuit”204 and distinguished between prior 
restraints and subsequent sanctions.205 This case provided strong 
 
 198 California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), and 
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49 
(1993), concerned the scope of the Sherman Act. Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983), Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 896-97 (1984), and 
BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002), concerned the scope of the 
National Labor Relations Act. This was the sole line of cases cited by the Guarnieri 
majority in support of the proposition that lawsuits are petitions. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 
at 387.  
 199 461 U.S. 731 (1983). 
 200 Id. at 748-49. 
 201 Id. at 742.  
 202 Id. at 741-42.  
 203 Id. at 743 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 204 Id. at 753 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 205 See id. (Brennan, J., concurring). 
  
2017] The First Amendment Right to a Remedy 1793 
support for the remedial theory: it recognized that the right to petition 
the courts is particularly threatened by prior restraints that would 
“totally deprive[] [a litigant] of a remedy for an actual injury.”206 
The economic litigation line was neither the only nor the first line of 
modern case law recognizing lawsuits as petitions — and providing 
often-overlooked support for a remedial access right. Less attention207 
has been paid to two other lines of cases: what I call the group 
litigation line — in which the Court struck down state regulations that 
interfered with the legal efforts of groups like the NAACP and labor 
unions;208 and what I call the prisoner access line — in which the 
Court developed an increasingly broad right of prisoners to access the 
courts.209 Each case in each of these lines is a mixed drink, not a pure 
shot of Petition Clause analysis, for the Petition Clause inquiry was 
bound up with other interpretative questions. Just as the economic 
litigation line involved federal statutes, the group litigation cases 
involved other First Amendment rights,210 and the prisoner access line 
implicated federal habeas, due process, and equal protection.211 But 
 
 206 Id. at 742. Although less explicitly concerned with the remedial function of the 
right to petition, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 
(1972), another economic litigation case, is also relevant to my theory. The Court in 
this case embraced an exception to immunity from retaliation for petitioning activity 
in the case of “sham litigation.” Citing prior First Amendment precedent, see id. at 
514-15, it explained that the burden antitrust liability imposed on the defendant’s First 
Amendment right to petition the courts was justified precisely because it was 
necessary to protect the plaintiff’s First Amendment right to petition the courts. Id. at 
511-12, 515. I incorporate this insight into my doctrinal approach. See infra notes 
260–61 and accompanying text.  
 207 See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 386 (2011) (in majority 
opinion, omitting mention of these lines of doctrine); id. at 402 & n.1 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (dismissing some of these 
cases as “advert[ing] vaguely” to lawsuits as petitions or as “habeas corpus cases,” and 
ignoring others); Andrews, Right of Access, supra note 8, at 571-76 (failing to consider 
important cases such as Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), in her analysis of the 
prisoner access line). 
 208 See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United 
Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Bhd. of R.R. 
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415 (1963). 
 209 See infra notes 220–41 and accompanying text.  
 210 See United Transp. Union, 401 U.S. at 578-79 (“First Amendment guarantees of 
free speech, petition, and assembly give railroad workers the right to . . . act 
collectively to secure good, honest lawyers to assert their claims against railroads.”); 
United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 222, 225 (“free speech, press, petition, or assembly” 
and “associational rights”); Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 2, 5-6, 8 (“freedom of speech, 
petition and assembly” and “associational rights”); Button, 371 U.S. at 428-29, 444-45. 
 211 See cases discussed infra at notes 220–41 and accompanying text. 
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instead of distilling out their Petition Clause insights, courts and 
scholars tend to dismiss these cases altogether. 
Take the group litigation line, in which the Justices agreed and 
repeatedly insisted that lawsuits are petitions for redress designed to 
enforce preexisting rights.212 The Court itself stated that the “common 
thread running through [all these] decisions . . . is that that collective 
activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a 
fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment.”213 
In NAACP v. Button,214 which struck down on First Amendment 
grounds a Virginia statute criminalizing the referral of prospective 
litigants to the NAACP, the Court stressed the remedial purpose of 
litigation215 and the functional importance of legal petitions in 
protecting political minorities.216 In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen 
v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, which upheld unions’ First 
Amendment right to recommend attorneys to their members,217 the 
Court focused on the importance of competent counsel to individuals’ 
right to petition the courts.218 This emphasis reflected a concern with 
meaningful access to courts — not the mere technical ability to lodge a 
complaint, but the practical opportunity “to vindicate their legal 
rights.”219 
 
 212 See Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 7 (“A State could not . . . infringe in any way the 
right . . . to be fairly represented in lawsuits . . . . The State can no more keep these 
workers from using their cooperative plan to advise one another than it could use 
more direct means to bar them from resorting to the courts to vindicate their legal 
rights. The right to petition the courts cannot be so handicapped.”); see also Button, 
371 U.S. at 429-30 (“[L]itigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a 
minority to petition for redress of grievances.”); id. at 455 (Harlan., J, dissenting) 
(“[T]he State surely may not broadly prohibit individuals . . . from joining together to 
petition a court for redress of their grievances . . . .”) Some Justices rejected the 
extension of Button to cases involving personal injury litigation. Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 
10 (Harlan, J., dissenting). However, others agreed that “[t]he grievances for redress 
of which the right of petition was insured . . . are not solely religious or political 
ones.” United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 223 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 
516, 5310 (1945)). 
 213 United Transp. Union, 401 U.S. at 585 (emphasis added). 
 214 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
 215 See id. at 453 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Litigation is often the desirable and 
orderly way . . . of obtaining vindication of fundamental rights.”). 
 216 See id. at 429-30 (“[U]nder the conditions of modern government, litigation 
may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of 
grievances.”). 
 217 Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 8. 
 218 See id. at 7 (“Laymen cannot be expected to know how to protect their rights 
when dealing with practiced and carefully counseled adversaries . . . .”). 
 219 Id. 
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It is the prisoner access line, however, which constitutes the most 
intriguing and least considered modern line of precedent that, 
properly understood, supports a remedial reading of the Petition 
Clause.220 In Cruz v. Beto, the Supreme Court required, pursuant to 
the First Amendment, a full adjudication of a Buddhist inmate’s 
allegation of religiously discriminatory prison practices.221 The First 
Amendment violation here was neither retaliation for litigation activity 
nor denial of forum access, but rather the trial court’s refusal to 
adjudicate, and, if warranted, remedy, Beto’s claim of legal injury.222 
Subsequently, in Bounds v. Smith,223 the Court held “that the 
fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires 
prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of 
meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law 
libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.”224 
 
 220 The origins of this doctrinal line are four cases between 1941 and 1971, in 
which the Court struck down state prison rules that burdened court access for 
prisoners. See Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 
483 (1969); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941). 
These four cases developed this court access right with an emphasis on federal habeas, 
due process, and equal protection, but its precise textual basis was unclear. In the 
1972 case of Cruz v. Beto, however, the Court explicitly identified this court access 
right as a component of the Petition Clause. See 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (“[P]ersons 
in prison, like other individuals, have the right to petition the Government for redress 
of grievances which, of course, includes ‘access of prisoners to the courts for the 
purpose of presenting their complaints.’” (quoting Avery, 393 U.S. at 485)). In three 
prisoner cases over the next three years, lawsuits were treated as First Amendment 
petitions without any Justice disputing the premise. See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 
U.S. 236, 244 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828 
(1974); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 n.5 (1973).  
 221 See Cruz, 405 U.S. at 321-22 (discussing a Buddhist inmate’s Constitutional 
right to remedial court access based on allegations of religious discrimination). 
 222 See id. at 321 (the lower court “denied relief without a hearing or any 
findings”). 
 223 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). 
 224 Id. at 828. Though Bounds reaffirmed the court access right as fundamental, and 
conceptualized the right in remedial terms, it failed to specify the right’s textual basis. 
See id. at 821-833. Though Bounds approvingly cited Beto, 405 U.S. 319 — and the 
three cases Beto cited as support for a First Amendment right of court access (Gilmore, 
404 U.S. 15; Avery, 393 U.S. 483; and Hull, 312 U.S. 546) — Bounds never mentioned 
the First Amendment framework embraced so explicitly in Beto and twice repeated by 
the Court in the four-year period between Beto and Bounds. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 828; 
Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 660 n.5. Two months after Bounds was decided, Justice Stevens 
explicitly invoked a First Amendment right to petition the Courts without any Justice 
disputing the premise. See Montanye, 427 U.S. at 244 (Stevens, J., dissenting). And in 
the years after Bounds, Justices continued to recognize without objection a First 
Amendment right to petition the courts. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 
(1984) (“Like others, prisoners have the constitutional right to petition the 
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The Bounds majority insisted that the “inmate access to the courts 
[must be] adequate, effective, and meaningful”225 and conceptualized 
meaningful access as something broader than mere forum access, 
observing that judges might “overlook meritorious cases” without 
effective litigation,226 and emphasizing the remedial dynamic of legal 
petitions, judicial relief, and protection of individual rights.227 Four 
years later, in Rhodes v. Chapman,228 the Court rejected an Eighth 
Amendment challenge to prison conditions, but emphasized that the 
federal courts have a duty to remedy constitutional violations.229 In 
concurrence, Justice Brennan linked a prisoner’s right to petition to a 
court’s “obligation to take steps to remedy the violations,”230 and no 
Justice disputed Brennan’s suggestion that the right to petition entails 
this remedial duty.231 
More recently, there has been dissensus on the Court as to the 
remedial scope of prisoners’ court access right. In Lewis v. Casey,232 the 
Court limited the Bounds right to access legal materials — but did so 
 
Government for redress of their grievances, which includes a reasonable right of 
access to the courts.”); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 362 & n.9 (1981) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing the “constitutional minima” to 
which prisons must conform, including permitting the constitutional right of access to 
judicial remedies). Finally, in Lewis v. Casey, where the Court limited but reaffirmed 
Bounds, both the respondents and Justice Stevens framed the Bounds court access right 
in terms of the right to petition. See 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996) (describing respondents’ 
claim); id. at 405-06 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 225 Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822-23. 
 226 Id. at 826.  
 227 See id. at 824-25 (assuming that prisoners must have “a reasonably adequate 
opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the 
courts”); id. at 827-28 (emphasizing that “original actions seeking . . . vindication of 
fundamental civil rights . . . are of ‘fundamental importance . . . in our constitutional 
scheme’ because they directly protect our most valued rights” (citations omitted)); id. 
at 828 (“[T]he prisoner petitions here are the first line of defense against 
constitutional violations.”).  
 228 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
 229 See id. at 352 (“[F]ederal courts will discharge their duty to protect 
constitutional rights.” (citing Beto, 405 U.S. at 321) (other citations omitted)). 
 230 Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 231 Indeed, every opinion recognized the important role of the courts in enforcing 
rights — particularly those of political minorities. See id. at 352; id. at 359 
(“Insulated . . . from political pressures, and charged with the duty of enforcing the 
Constitution, courts are in the strongest position to insist that unconstitutional 
conditions be remedied . . . .”); id. at 369 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); 
id. at 377 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen conditions are deplorable and the 
political process offers no redress . . . the federal courts are required by the 
Constitution to play a role.”).  
 232 518 U.S. 343 (1996). 
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mostly in dicta.233 Justice Stevens in dissent cast the court access right 
in terms that were both based on the Petition Clause and explicitly 
remedial.234 The majority, in dicta, sought to limit the right’s scope to 
forum access235 and to petitions challenging confinement or the 
conditions of confinement.236 However, three justices would have 
embraced a right to “research, consult about, file, or litigate”237 a 
broader class of claims.238 
A decade after Lewis, in the 2006 case of Woodford v. Ngo,239 Justice 
Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter, dissented from the 
Court’s strict construction of an exhaustion requirement in the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, calling for application of the constitutional 
avoidance canon because the Court’s interpretation may violate the 
“fundamental right” to “access the courts” guaranteed by the “First 
Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of 
grievances.”240 Note that the inmate in this case was allowed to file a 
lawsuit but denied a remedy on exhaustion grounds.241 The majority 
did not dispute Justice Stevens’ implicit assertion that the First 
Amendment entailed a remedial duty, but rather did not engage with 
the constitutional question at all. In sum, the prisoner access line 
provides substantial support for a First Amendment right to a remedy, 
as a matter of both source and scope. 
Outside of these three lines of doctrine, the Court considered a 
remedial access claim in the 2002 case of Christopher v. Harbury.242 
 
 233 Id. at 350-56. 
 234 See id. at 404-06, 405 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing prisoner access and 
economic litigation cases to establish that the right of court access is part of the right 
to petition, and noting that “[w]ithout the ability to access the courts . . . all of us — 
prisoners and free citizens alike — would be deprived of the first — and often the 
only — ‘line of defense’ against constitutional violations”). 
 235 See id. at 354-55 (majority opinion); see also id. at 409 n.6 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the Court’s “conclusion regarding the scope of the right is 
purely dicta”). 
 236 Id. at 355 (majority opinion). But see id. at 404 (Souter, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (“This case does not require us to 
consider . . . and I would not address such issues here.”); id. at 409 n.6 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“This statement is also largely unnecessary.”). 
 237 Id. at 401 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in 
the judgment). 
 238 See id. at 403-04. Both sides of this debate recognize that court access vindicates 
underlying rights. 
 239 548 U.S. 81 (2006).  
 240 Id. at 122-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).  
 241 Id. at 87 (majority opinion). 
 242 536 U.S. 403 (2002). 
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The Guatemalan government captured, tortured, and executed 
Harbury’s husband, a Guatemalan rebel leader. Among other 
allegations, Harbury claimed that State Department officials 
intentionally misled her about her husband’s whereabouts, preventing 
her from obtaining a meaningful remedy; had the officials revealed to 
her that her husband was in Guatemalan custody, she would have 
pursued emergency injunctive relief, which could have saved his 
life.243 The Court recognized that some of its prior cases had 
“grounded the right of access to courts in . . . the First Amendment 
Petition Clause,”244 among other textual sources. The Court then 
emphasized the link between right and remedy: 
[T]he very point of recognizing any access claim is to provide 
some effective vindication for a separate and distinct right to 
seek judicial relief for some wrong . . . . [T]he right [of court 
access] is ancillary to the underlying claim [of legal wrong], 
without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being 
shut out of court.245 
For this reason, the Court held that a “backward-looking access claim” 
like Harbury’s must identify both “the underlying cause of action and 
its lost remedy.”246 The Court ultimately rejected Harbury’s access 
claim because it could not uniquely “address any injury she has 
suffered.”247 Thus, instead of rejecting this remedial access claim, the 
Court imposed a pleading requirement that embraced the claim’s 
remedial logic. 
Taken together, Harbury and the three lines of court access cases 
provide strong, yet heretofore under-appreciated, precedential support 
for a remedial theory of the Petition Clause. 
II. APPLICATION 
In this Part, I sketch how the remedial interpretation of the Petition 
Clause might translate into a workable doctrinal framework. I suggest 
a framework of tiered scrutiny that coheres with other strands of First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Finally, I suggest how this new framework 
 
 243 Id. at 409-10. 
 244 Id. at 415 n.12. 
 245 Id. at 414-15. 
 246 Id. at 415-16 (emphasis added); see also id. at 416 (“[B]ecause these backward-
looking cases are brought to get relief unobtainable in other suits, the remedy sought 
must itself be identified . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 247 Id. at 422. 
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might change the analysis and outcomes of challenges to a wide 
variety of real-world remedial access barriers. 
A. A New Doctrinal Framework for Remedial Access Claims 
The remedial interpretation of the Petition Clause translates 
naturally into a tiered scrutiny doctrinal framework for remedial 
access claims, whereby legally injured persons could challenge, and 
courts would scrutinize, rules or practices that denied, limited, or 
delayed access to meaningful judicial remedies. While full 
development of this framework lies beyond the scope of this article, 
this section begins the process by presenting the essential features of 
this framework, so as to suggest in more concrete terms the theory’s 
primary doctrinal significance. 
Under this proposed framework, a successful remedial access claim 
would entail: (1) a particularized legal injury (which would trigger a 
presumptive remedial entitlement); (2) a deprivation of a minimally 
adequate remedy (which would constitute a remedial burden); and 
(3) the absence of a sufficient governmental interest justifying the 
remedial burden (which would elevate the remedial burden into an 
impermissible infringement of the remedial right). I discuss each of 
these elements below. 
First, the remedial component of the Petition Clause only applies to 
legal petitions as opposed to political petitions. Thus the petitioner 
must show that she seeks redress of an individualized, legal grievance 
concerning the alleged violation of a pre-existing legal right. The 
petitioner must generally show that, pursuant to valid extant 
substantive and procedural law,248 she established legal injury or likely 
would have established legal injury but for the challenged burden.249 
 
 248 The seemingly simple requirement masks an array of related definitional 
challenges centering upon one primary question: which legal rules should be 
understood as burdening litigants’ access to extant legal remedies, and which legal rules 
can be said to validly define whether they have suffered a cognizable legal injury at all? 
Answering this question requires some effort to distinguish between substantive, 
procedural, and remedial rules. We might say, for example, that a legislative repeal of 
a statutory cause of action does not deny a remedy; it rather denies a right. On the 
other hand, we might say that an exorbitant filing fee without any opportunity to file 
in forma pauperis would deny a remedy to those who suffered legally cognizable 
injuries. The line between the repeal of a right and the denial of a remedy, however, is 
not always clear, and the way in which judges draw it would have serious 
consequences for the scope of the First Amendment right to a remedy. On the one 
hand, if all procedural and substantive rules could be challenged as violations of 
remedial access under the Petition Clause, there would be an explosion of claims and 
a threat to legislatures’ ability to define the law. This was one of the primary reasons 
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Next, the petitioner must show her right has been burdened by 
demonstrating a remedial deprivation. Note that the right to a remedy 
is only the right to a minimally adequate remedy, not the right to the 
petitioner’s preferred remedy, or the maximal remedy. Minimal 
adequacy must be defined objectively in terms of the underlying 
purposes of remediation — vindication, retrospective compensation, 
and prospective protection of legal rights through deterrence of future 
violations.250 To satisfy the adequacy element, the petitioner will 
generally have to show complete denial of any remedy, or that the 
remedy was so severely limited as to fall below an objective minimum 
standard — to fail to meaningfully serve the vindicatory, 
compensatory, and deterrent functions of judicial remedies such that 
it effectively undermines the underlying legal right.251 
The final element of a remedial access claim is abridgement: the 
absence of a sufficient governmental reason for burdening the 
remedial right. The first two elements — an inadequate remedy for the 
violation of a legal right — only show that the right to a remedy has 
been implicated or burdened. But implication does not necessarily 
mean violation; not every burden is an impermissible abridgement. 
Instead, the government must proffer reasons for the burdening law or 
practice. The court would then consider the character and severity of 
the remedial burden and assess both the strength of the asserted 
 
why Professor Andrews eschewed a remedial definition of court access. See Andrews, 
Right of Access, supra note 8, at 560. On the other hand, if no procedural or 
substantive law could ever be challenged, the right to a remedy could easily be 
circumvented by the simple expedient of characterizing limits on remedies as 
substantive or procedural rules — as new defenses, limitations on causes of actions, 
and so forth.  
Consider, for example, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, which 
provides for immediate dismissal of any lawsuits against gun manufacturers based on 
third-party misuse. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7902(b), 7903(5)(A) (2012). Does this provision 
limit rights or remedies? See City of N.Y. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 397 
(2d Cir. 2008) (concluding — I would argue, incorrectly — that the Act does not 
implicate the right to petition because it provides a substantive defense). Whether 
specific types of rules should be categorized as changing rights or burdening remedies 
deserves considerable further attention that goes beyond the scope of the paper.  
 249 There is an additional definitional question of what standard of likelihood of 
success would apply.  
 250 See Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (“The first 
amendment interests involved in private litigation [include] compensation for violated 
rights and interests [and] the psychological benefits of vindication . . . .” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 251 See, e.g., Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 688-89, 691, 718 (Tex. 1988) 
(invalidating, on state right-to-a-remedy grounds, the application of a statutory 
damages cap “[i]n the case of a permanently and catastrophically injured infant”).  
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governmental interest and the closeness of fit between this interest and 
the challenged law or practice.252 
Courts should apply this balancing test using a tiered scrutiny 
framework familiar to First Amendment jurisprudence, under which 
certain factors would trigger heightened scrutiny. For example, 
borrowing from the speech context, a burden that is petitioner-based is 
more suspect than one that is petitioner-neutral.253 If the burden 
depends on the identity of the rights-holder — for example, a rule 
limiting access to the courts for prisoners only254 — heightened 
scrutiny is appropriate. Similarly, if the burden is content-based rather 
than content-neutral, heightened scrutiny should apply.255 Thus, if the 
burden only applies when a particular type of grievance is asserted, or 
when a particular class of defendants is involved — for example, doctors 
or gun manufacturers256 — the burden is more suspect and should be 
subjected to more exacting scrutiny. Furthermore, just as First 
Amendment protection is greater for core political speech,257 
heightened scrutiny should apply if the burden is imposed only where 
the government itself, rather than a private party, is the defendant in a 
lawsuit. This means that governmental immunity doctrines outside of 
the sovereign immunity context,258 such as absolute immunity for 
judges and prosecutors and qualified immunity for executive officials 
 
 252 Cf., e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1445 (2014) 
(“[W]e must assess the fit between the stated governmental objective and the means 
selected to achieve that objective.”); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 
744 (2008) (“[T]he strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness 
of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.”). 
 253 Cf., e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010) 
(“[T]he Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s 
corporate identity.”). 
 254 See, e.g., Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 
1321 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28, & 42 U.S.C. (2012)); Woodford 
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (“Congress enacted the [PLRA] . . . in the wake of a 
sharp rise in prisoner litigation in the federal courts . . . [and] contains a variety of 
provisions designed to bring this [prison] litigation under control.”); Katherine A. 
Macfarlane, A New Approach to Local Rules, 11 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 121, 144-48 (2015) 
(describing local rules setting restrictions that apply only to prisoners). 
 255 Cf., e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) 
(describing strict scrutiny standard for content-based restrictions in the speech 
context). 
 256 See supra note 248 (discussing Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act). 
 257 See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339 (“The First Amendment has its fullest 
and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.” 
(quotations omitted)).  
 258 The Eleventh Amendment qualifies the applicability of the Petition Clause to 
sovereign immunity. See supra note 18. 
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including police officers and school administrators, would be 
subjected to heightened scrutiny. However, “reasonable time, place, 
and manner restrictions” would be permissible.259 
Finally, particular categories of asserted governmental interests may 
warrant either heightened solicitude or heightened skepticism. Where 
a burden on remedial access is imposed in order to preserve the 
integrity and efficacy of the judicial system and to ensure its 
availability to all, the burden may have a particularly strong 
justification because, in globo, it enhances remedial access to the 
courts.260 By contrast, courts may refuse to credit an asserted 
governmental interest in suppressing petitions or their efficacy as a 
mechanism of citizen influence and governmental accountability.261 
Beyond this tiered scrutiny framework, a First Amendment right to a 
remedy may also impact the proper application of the constitutional 
avoidance canon,262 equal protection principles,263 and the Eleventh 
 
 259 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009). 
 260 See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 514 (1972) 
(“Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to 
keep others from publishing is not”); see also supra note 206.  
 261 The Roberts Court has invoked this anti-suppression principle to reject asserted 
justifications for campaign finance regulation based on limiting the influence of 
wealthy donors. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 
1450-51 (“[T]he possibility that an individual who spends large sums may garner 
‘influence over or access to’ elected officials or political parties . . . [does not allow] 
the Government . . . to seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or access”.). 
However, the Court has not yet recognized the First Amendment significance of the 
fact that non-constitutional official immunity doctrines are explicitly justified as 
mechanisms to limit the influence of rights-holders on official decision-making. But 
see Nereida-Gonzalez v. Tirado-Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 704-05 (1st Cir. 1993) (“A 
primary purpose of providing officials with qualified immunity is to ensure that fear of 
personal liability will not unduly influence or inhibit their performance of public 
duties.”). I intend to consider this disconnect in a future article. 
 262 When choosing between reasonable interpretations of a statutory provision, the 
avoidance canon combined with a First Amendment right to a remedy would favor the 
one that imposed a lesser burden on the ability of a legally injured person to obtain a 
meaningful remedy. See, e.g., Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 122 (2006) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 518-19 (2002) (construing 
NLRA provision narrowly to avoid “the difficult constitutional question whether a 
class of petitioning may be declared unlawful when a substantial portion is 
subjectively and objectively genuine”); Alexander H. Schmidt, Challenging the Supreme 
Court’s American Express Decision Under the First Amendment Petition Clause, 28 
ANTITRUST 39, 43 (2014). 
 263 In addition to the heightened scrutiny I contemplate under the First 
Amendment, courts may also apply heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause if a rule or practice differentially burdens an individual’s exercise of her 
fundamental right — here, to obtain an adequate remedy for legal injury. San Antonio 
  
2017] The First Amendment Right to a Remedy 1803 
Amendment.264 Together, these doctrinal innovations would provide 
legally injured persons with powerful tools with which to challenge 
remedial access barriers.265 
B. A Survey of Vulnerable Remedial Access Burdens 
These new doctrinal tools would have far-reaching practical 
implications, calling into question a wide array of state and federal laws. 
One way to gauge how a First Amendment right to a remedy would 
operate in practice is to consider those remedial access barriers 
invalidated by state courts pursuant to state constitutional provisions 
guaranteeing a right to a remedy. Such barriers include preconditions 
to filing suit, statutes of repose, statutes of limitations when applied 
against minors or with no discovery rule exception, and limits on 
compensatory damages.266 Each of these barriers denies, limits, or 
delays remedies for a particular class of plaintiffs, defendants, or 
claims. A First Amendment right to a remedy would bring much 
 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). 
 264 The First Amendment right to a remedy does not trump the later-ratified 
Eleventh Amendment. As a result, there are cases in which a federal court will not 
have jurisdiction over a lawsuit filed by an individual against a state, despite the 
remedial burden. However, there is great debate over the meaning of the Eleventh 
Amendment, and current Eleventh Amendment doctrine goes farther than the literal 
text requires. See John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise 
Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1672 (2004). See generally Amar, Of 
Sovereignty, supra note 1. A First Amendment right to a remedy would inform this 
debate, because the proper interpretive inquiry would be how to strike the correct 
balance between two constitutional values, rather than how to interpret the Eleventh 
Amendment against a constitutional abyss. This is a more moderate approach than 
James Pfander takes, in arguing that the Petition “clause’s affirmation of government 
suability operates as a constitutional antidote to the familiar doctrine of sovereign 
immunity[.]” Pfander, supra note 8, at 899.  
 265 Moreover, the set of laws or practices courts may invalidate or require pursuant 
to the right to a remedy is not the full measure of its potential impact. See Aliza Plener 
Cover, Archetypes of Faith: How Americans See, and Believe in, Their Constitution, 26 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 555, 573 (2015) (“[C]ombination of deep faith and relatively 
unschooled knowledge allows people to make claims about the Constitution that have 
important political consequences, without being fully bound by precedent or text.”). 
For example, even if judges conclude that a First Amendment right to a remedy does 
not empower them to mandate appointed counsel in civil cases, federal or state 
lawmakers may elect to provide attorneys in certain cases, and public discourse about 
a right to a remedy may affect these policy choices by framing certain priorities in 
terms of constitutional values. See Fair Day in Court for Kids Act of 2016, S. 2540, 
114th Cong. (proposed bill that would provide counsel in immigration proceedings to 
children, persons with disabilities, and victims of abuse, torture, or violence). 
 266 Phillips, supra note 3, at 1311-12 (citing cases). 
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needed uniformity to this area of law, calling into question similar 
rules in any state, irrespective of differences in state constitutional text 
and interpretation.267 
Moreover, a First Amendment right to a remedy would call into 
question a host of federal statutory provisions as judicially construed, 
including the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,268 the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act,269 the Federal Arbitration Act,270 the 
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act,271 and doctrines of 
qualified and absolute immunity.272 
To take but one of these examples, suppose a police officer fatally 
shoots an unarmed man. Even if the officer violated the victim’s 
Fourth Amendment rights, under the Supreme Court’s increasingly 
aggressive qualified immunity doctrine, the federal courts may provide 
no remedy. Qualified immunity prevents injured individuals from 
obtaining a remedy even for an admitted violation of a constitutional 
right if that right has not yet been articulated with sufficient clarity.273 
Indeed, the petitioner may not even get the remedial benefit of 
declaratory relief.274 This remedy denial applies only when the 
defendant is a governmental actor, and thus a remedial access 
challenge would trigger heightened scrutiny. Whether the doctrine 
survives that scrutiny would depend on the strength of interests 
 
 267 State right-to-a-remedy provisions have been interpreted in remarkably different 
ways by different state courts. Scholars have struggled to explain these divergent 
approaches. See, e.g., Bauman, supra note 4, at 244 (“[B]oth [of the major] variations 
have been expansively and narrowly interpreted.”); Phillips, supra note 3, at 1314-15. 
 268 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the U.S. Code). 
 269 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 132 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 
28, & 42 U.S.C.).  
 270 Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–
14 (2012)).  
 271 Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–
7903 (2012)). 
 272 Note that I am referring here to non-constitutional immunity doctrines, rather 
than the constitutionally-driven sovereign immunity doctrine. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; 
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890). 
 273 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011); Stephen R. Reinhardt, The 
Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing 
Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some 
Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1244-48 (2015). 
 274 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (overruling Saucier v. Katz, 
533 U.S. 194 (2001), and permitting judges to dispose of a case on qualified immunity 
grounds without resolving the merits of the constitutional claim). 
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proffered in its defense, and the closeness of fit between the immunity 
and those interests. 
CONCLUSION 
The scope and independent significance of the First Amendment’s 
Petition Clause are important doctrinal questions presently steeped in 
uncertainty. I address these questions by proposing an alternative 
theory of the Petition Clause’s meaning: the right “to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances” guarantees not only the right 
to ask for redress from any of the three branches of government, but, 
in the special case of meritorious legal petitions, a right to obtain a 
minimally adequate remedy. This theory enjoys supports from the 
Clause’s history, text, and judicial interpretation. Historically, the co-
evolution of the English right to a remedy and right to petition, which 
together provided strong protections for individuals to receive 
remedies in response to legal petitions addressed to the King, 
Parliament, and courts, support the idea that legal petitions would 
have been understood to entail a correlative right to a remedy. The 
text and drafting history of the Clause, including its linguistic 
structure and the unprecedented extension of the recipient subclause 
from “the Legislature” to “the Government,” strongly support the 
remedial interpretation. Finally, early American and more modern 
case law provide under-appreciated confirmation of the notion that 
the petitionary right entails a remedial component in the case of legal 
petitions. All of this evidence, which supports elevated expectations 
and requirements of obtaining the redress sought in the context of 
legal petitions, makes sense when we understand that both petitioning 
practice and the Petition Clause itself serve a dual function within a 
democratic society: to protect majoritarian participatory interests 
through political petitions, and to protect minoritarian rights 
vindication through legal petitions. 
The remedial interpretation of the Petition Clause, if accepted, 
would have immediate and far-reaching consequences. It would lead 
to increased judicial scrutiny into burdens placed on individuals’ 
remedial rights in such varied contexts as governmental immunity 
doctrines, caps on tort damage awards, and legislative limitations on 
prisoners’ ability to enforce their constitutional rights. The time has 
come to resolve the ongoing state of confusion surrounding the 
meaning of the Petition Clause, and to vindicate the Framers’ intent to 
provide remedial protections to legally injured persons petitioning the 
courts. 
